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Regulating Payday Lenders in Canada: Drawing 
on American Lessons 
Stephanie Ben-lshai* 
The regulation of payday loans holds the potential of extending the benefits of regulating 
overindebtness, currently provided via bankruptcy legislation to the middle-class, to 
lower income debtors. This potential needs to be balanced against lower income debtors' 
need for credit and the corresponding benefits resulting from access to credit provided 
by alternative credit markets, such as the payday lending market. Unlike the United 
States, where payday lenders have more locations than Starbucks and McDonalds 
combined, and payday lending regulation is up there with Vampire Weekend and the 
Tipping Point as an attention grabbing pop-culture reference, payday lending is rela-
tively new, underdeveloped and unregulated in Canada. Over the last year, in the wake 
of a recent amendment to the Canadian Criminal Code, that would see payday lenders 
exempted from the 60 per cent criminal rate of interest in provinces where payday 
lenders are provincially regulated, Canadian provinces have began to regulate and put 
forth regulatory proposals for a previously unregulated area. This exercise has been 
attempted in the context of limited recent published domestic academic analysis of the 
payday lending industry, borrowers and regulatory options. Accordingly, this article 
sets out to fill this void. The article draws on the American experience with payday 
lending and payday lending regulation, and also a first-hand experience of attempting 
to obtain a payday loan in Toronto, Ontario, to evaluate the current provincial reform 
efforts. 
La reglementation des prets sur salaire poursuit Les memes objectifs que Les regles sur 
le surendettement actuellement recherches par Les Lois sur la faillite, a l' egard des 
debiteurs de la classe moyenne et afaible revenu. Les besoins de credit des debiteurs a 
faible revenu et Les benefices qu 'ils tirent de l'acces au credit foumi par Les marches du 
credit altematif tel que le marche du pret sur salaire, doivent s 'equilibrer. Aux Etats-
Unis, Les preteurs sur salaire comptent plus de succursales que Starbucks et McDonald 
reunis et la reglementation entourant ces prets sur salaire se situe au meme niveau que 
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I am grateful 
for comments from David Clarke and Dave Dupuis of the Office of Consumer Affairs, 
Tony Duggan, Benjamin Geva, Stephen Lubben, Jacob Ziegel, and for the input received 
at a presentation of an earlier form of this article to the Faculty Colloquium Workshop at 
Seton Hall Law School. The splendid research assistance provided by Virginia Torrie, 
Catherine Nowak, and Zohar Levy is gratefully acknowledged. Research for this article is 
current to April 8, 2008. All errors are my own. 
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/es Vampire Weelund et les Tipping Point. manifestation type de la culture populaire; 
au Canada, /es prits sur sa/aire onl fail leur apparition recemment, ne sont pas encore 
tres dlveloppls ni tres encadrls. A la suited' une modification apportie au Code criminel 
canadien permettant aux priteurs sur salaire d · i tre dispenses du taux d 'intlrit criminel 
de (j() % dans /es provinces ou /es prits sur salaire sont rig is par des lois provinciales. 
/es provinces canadiennes ont commend a rlglementer un domaine qui ne l'ltait pas 
auparavant, a la /umiere d 'un nombre restreint d ' analyses domestiques sur la question. 
Cet article a ltl lcrit dans le but de comb/er un vide. JI rlfere a I' experience amlricaine 
dans le domaine des prets sur sa/aire ainsi qu 'a une experience acquise sur place /ors 
d'une tentative pour obtenir un prit sur salaire a Toronto. en Ontario. 
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Payday loans are a relatively new phenomenon in Canada. They 
are typically short-term, single-payment loans: the lender agrees to lend 
the debtor a certain amount of money, in return for the promise of 
repayment (usually on a cheque from the debtor, post-dated to the date 
of his or her next paycheque) and certain fees. Payday lending has been 
vilified in recent media coverage of subprime or fringe lending. Often 
payday lending is described as "predatory." Three key arguments are 
made in support of the "predatory" label: payday lenders charge too 
much money; payday lenders target the poor; and payday lenders lie to 
customers (or omit information). At the same time, payday lending, like 
other forms of fringe lending in the past, plays a role in servicing and 
giving access to credit to an otherwise neglected segment of the market: 
minority and disenfranchised groups. 
In the wake of a recent amendment to the federal Criminal Code 
that would see payday lenders exempted from the 60 per cent criminal 
rate of interest in provinces where payday lenders are provincially reg-
ulated, Canadian provinces have begun to regulate and put forth regu-
latory proposals for a previously unregulated area. This exercise has 
been attempted in the context of limited recent published domestic 
academic analysis of the payday lending industry, borrowers and regu-
latory options. Accordingly, this article sets out to fill this void by 
drawing on the American experience with payday lending and payday 
lending regulation, and also a first-hand experience of attempting to 
obtain a payday loan in Toronto, Ontario. First an introduction to the 
"payday lending debate" is provided. Second, the business model for 
payday lenders operating in Canada is set out. Third, the evolving Ca-
nadian regulatory scheme is outlined. The fourth section of the article 
documents six attempts to obtain loans from payday lenders in Toronto, 
Ontario. The fifth section of the article provides an analysis of the 
American tools used for regulating payday lenders. The sixth section of 
the article evaluates the evolving Canadian regulatory scheme in light 
of lessons drawn from the use of the various regulatory tools in the 
United States and the visits to Canadian payday lenders. Part seven 
concludes with reflections on two possible directions for future research: 
the role of Canadian corporate and securities law and the corporate social 
responsibility movement in facilitating a change in the practices of 
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payday lenders and the potential of American Community Reinvestment 
Act style legislation in Canada. 
1. AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYDAY LENDING 
One of the most common fonns of attack leveled against payday 
lenders begins with the author recounting the story of a borrower, usually 
a woman of modest means, often of a minority group, who takes out a 
payday loan for a small amount to make ends meet and ends up paying 
thousands of dollars in fees without ever paying off the principal.1 The 
interest charged by payday lenders is generally over 400 per cent annual 
percentage rate (APR),2 and other fees including rollover or extension 
fees can further increase the cost of a loan. Given that in Canada, the 
federal criminal usury rate is 60 per cent, the rates charged even by 
compliant payday lenders are far above what mainstream credit provid-
ers charge. Because the rate of interest charged is so high, the payday 
lending transaction has been described as "one-sided," and not extending 
any real benefit to payday loan consumers.3 Further, payday lenders 
structure their loans in such a way as to be most profitable to them. For 
example, the date on which the loan is due is usually the day before the 
borrower's paycheque arrives, so lenders are able to charge additional 
fees for repayment after the due date.4 
Even if these fees and interest were reasonable for a single trans-
action, the fact that the majority of payday lenders are repeat customers 
1 See for example: Patricia Turner ended up paying $840 in extension fees for a $300 loan 
which she was not able to pay down in Charles Bruch, 'Taking the Pay Out of Payday 
Loans: Putting an End 10 the Usurious and U nconscionablc Interest Rates Charged by Payday 
Lenders" (2001) 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257; Sandra Harris0 s experience with payday lenders 
resulted in her car being repossessed and wages garnered in Michael Bertics. "Fixing Payday 
Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank lnvohement" (2005) 9 N.C. Banking lnst. 133; 
most newspaper articles on payday lenders also start with a similar story, like Margaret 
Smith in "Caught in the Loan Trap: Paying it Back Can Become a Vicious Circle" (19 June 
2004) Toronto Star. 
2 Creola Johnson, "Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?" (2002) 87 Minn. 
L. Rev. I at 27; Kathleen E. Keest & El.izabeth Renuart, The Cost ofCredil: Regulation and 
Legal Challenges, 2nd ed. (Boston: National Consumer Law Center, 2000) at 297; Aaron 
Huckstep, "Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean Outrageous Profitsr' 
(2006) 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 203 at 208; in Canada the situation is similar, as 
reflected in Protecting Canadians· Interest: Reining in the Payday Lending Industry 
(ACORN Canada: Vancouver, 2004) at I ["ACORN Report"]. 
3 Bruch. supra, n. I at 1279. 
•ACORN Report, supra, n. 2 at 10. 
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means that many borrowers are trapped in the scheme for the long hauf.S 
Instead of encouraging customers to pay off their debt, payday lenders 
extend loans (for a hefty fee) or allow borrowers to take out new loans 
to repay the old ones;6 many payday lenders encourage customers to 
take out multiple loans at the same time.7 In fact. the very nature of the 
payday loan and its short duration (typically two weeks), means that 
rolling over loans is often inevitable for payday borrowers. 8 This rollover 
feature can cause consumers to "accumulate an unmanageable cycle of 
debt.''9 
As two American commentators argue, payday lenders "feed off 
poverty and financial exclusion."1° For example, the average American 
payday loan customer is likely to be a member of a minority group from 
an inner city neighborhood. 11 Some sources (often payday lenders or 
organizations representing them) paint a more tlattering picture of pay-
day borrowers, suggesting that payday customers make an average salary 
of around $35,000, a third of them own their homes, and that they have 
been in their jobs and homes for around 4 years.12 However, this descrip-
tion of the demographic is discredited by most academics, as numbers 
like that are sometimes reflective of county-wide averages rather than 
actual payday loan customers. 13 
Often, payday loan customers have low fixed incomes.•• Their 
income leaves little room for coping with emergencies or additional 
expenses. The target customers for payday lenders rarely have the sur-
• Bruch , supra, n. I at 1280; Huckstep, supra, n. 2 at 208. 
• Bruch, supra, n. I at 128 1. 
' Bertics, supra, n. 1 at 138-9. 
a Ibid .. at 138. 
9 Carmen Butler & Niloufar Park, "M ayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Responsibility 
Save Payday Lcndersr' (2005) 3 Rutgers J.L. & Urb. Pol'y 119 at 122. 
10 H. Palmer, Profiting from Poverty: Why Debt is Big Business in Britain ( New Economics 
Foundation: Londo n, 2002). 
11 Laurie Burlingame, ~A Pro-Consumer Approac h to Predatory Lending: Enhanced Protcc· 
tion Through Federal Legislation and Ne w Approaches to Education" (2006) 60 Cons umer 
Fin. L .Q. Rep. 460 at 462; Ly nn Drysdale & Kathleen Keest, "'The Two-Tiered Cons umer 
Financial Services Marl<etplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challe nge to Current 
Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society" (2000) 51 S.C. L. Rev . 589 
at 591. 
12 Drysdale &. Keest, ibid .. at 627. 
IJ Ibid .. at 629. 
1
• tl>Uf .. at 630, 631-32; Kurt Eggert "Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self· 
Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending" (2003) 36 Loy. L.A. 
L. Rev. 693. 
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plus in their budget they would need to pay back the interest fees charged 
by the lenders - if they did, they would not be turning to payday lenders 
in the first place. 15 
One of the other accusations most often levied against payday 
lenders is that they prevent customers from making educated choices or 
shopping around because they are not clear about the fees they charge. 
Many payday lenders hide basic infonnation about their loans from 
customers.16 Payday lenders have also been known to avoid disclosure 
of infonnation like interest rates or finance charges until right before the 
agreement is to be signed. 17 According to one study, payday lenders in 
Ohio do not typically disclose the triple digit interest rates they charge 
until after the payday loan agreement is signed. 18 Other American payday 
loan providers refused to respond to an oral request from a borrower 
who wanted to know the APR of their loan. 19 In another survey, only 37 
per cent of payday lenders gave an "even marginally accurate APR" 
when a telephone inquiry was made about the cost of credit. 20 
The misleading advertising is even more egregious in situations 
where there is a legitimately better option - for example, in the context 
of the American military, where active duty personnel can receive in-
terest-free emergency Joans but still tum to payday lenders because of 
their "powerful marketing campaigns."21 
Even for borrowers who are somewhat aware that there are statutory 
limits on interest that can be charged (in some American states, and in 
Canada until the amendments to s. 347 of the Criminal Code), payday 
lenders can still convince them to borrow without violating their rights 
since they will often charge very little "interest" and collect the remain-
der of their money as various types of fees.22 However, where the issue 
" Bruch, supra, n. I at 1280. 
•• Benics. supra, n. I at 139 citing Johnson, supra, n. 2 at 32; Butler & Park, supra, n. 9 at 
121. 
17 Christophtt L Peterson, ''Truth, Understanding, and High Cost Consumer Credit: The 
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act" (2003) SS Fla. L. Rev. 807 at 898. 
11 Johnson, supra, n. 2 at 32. 
19 Jean Ann Fox & Edmund Mierzwinski, "Rent-A-Bank: How Banks Help Payday Lenders 
Evade State Consumer Protections," the 200 I Payday Lender Survey and Repon, (CF A & 
State Public Interest Re~arch Groups), o nl ine: < http:llwww.uspirg.org> at 13. 
20 Bruch, supra, n. I at 1284. 
21 Drysdale & Keest. supra. n. 11 at 630-1 . 
22 ACORN repon, supra, n. 2 at 11 ; Bruch, supra, n. I at 1276. 
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has been litigated, couns have recognized that these fees are interest, 
and generally classified them as such when deciding cases.23 
There remains an upside to payday lending. Consider the role that 
payday lending plays in servicing and giving access to credit to an 
otherwise neglected segment of the market. Many customers of payday 
loans feel they have nowhere else to go. 24 Payday lenders target consum-
ers who have low income and too little collateral to borrow from a 
bank.25 Banks also do not offer short-term, small loans, and very often 
payday loan customers are not able to qualify for a credit card.26 Cus-
tomers frequently need the money for an emergency or unexpected 
expense,27 and are unable to find another source of credit with which to 
" Bruch , supra, n. I at 1276; Drysdale & Kcc:st, supra, n. 11 at 642. The issue has oot been 
fully litigated in Canada, however it is notable that a number of class actions have been 
recently certified based on restitutiomary claims arising from the alleged charging of crim-
inal rates of interest (under the earlier version of section 347 of the Criminal Code) on 
payday loans. See: McCutcheon v. Cash Store Inc. (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 2973, (2006] 
O.J . No. 1860, 27 C.P.C. (6th)293, 80 O .R. (3d)644 (Ont. S.CJ.);Smith v. National Money 
Mart Co. (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 29 , [2007) OJ. No. 46, 29 E.T.R. (3d) 199, 37 C.P.C. 
(6th) 171 (Ont. S.C.J.); leave to appeal refused (2007), 2007 CanwellOnt 2177, 30 E.T.R. 
(3d) 163 (Ont. Div. Ct): MacKinnon v. National Money Mart Co .. 200S Carswe118C 436. 
(2005] B.CJ. No. 399, 2005 BCSC 27 1 (B.C. S .C.); leave to appeal refused 2006 
CarswellBC 2330, 2006 BCCA 393, 229 B.C.A.C. 278, 379 W.A.C. 278 (B.C. C.A. [In 
Chambers)); Kilroy v. A OK Payday loans Inc., 2006 CarswellBC 2039, [2006) B.C.J. No. 
1885, S9 8 .C.L.R. (4th) 78, [2006) 12 W.W.R. 626, 2006 BCSC 1213, 21 8.L.R. (4th)42, 
273 D.L.R. (4th) 2SS (B.C. S.C.); affinned 2007 CarswellBC 842, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 467, 
240 8 .C.A.C. ISi. 398 W.A.C. ISi. 2007 BCCA 231. 278 D.L.R . (4th) 193. (20071 8 
W.W.R . 480, 30 B.L.R. (4th) 87, 66 8.C.L.R. (4th) 360 (B.C. C.A.); Bodnar v. Payroll 
Loans Ltd., 2006 Carswell8C I 86S, (2006] B.C.J. No. 1705, 2006 8CSC 1132 (B.C. S .C.); 
Tracy v. lnstalcans Financial Schltions Centres ( 8. C. J Ud. , 2006 Carswell BC 1791, (2006 J 
B.CJ. No. 1639, 2006 8CSC 1018 (B.C. S .C.); leave to appeal allowed 2006 CarswellBC 
2023, (2006) B.C.J. No. 18SS, 2006 IBCCA 373 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]); reversed 2007 
CarswellBC 2392. (2007) B.C.J. N'o. 2182. 2007 8CCA 481 . 246 8 .C.A.C. 296. 406 
W.A.C. 296, 48 C .P.C. (6th) IS7, 28.S D.L.R. (4th) 413 (8 .C. C.A.); Bodnarv. Cash Store 
Inc., 2005 CarswellBC 204S, [200S) B.C.J. No. 1904, 2005 BCSC 1228 (B.C. S .C.); 
affirmed 2006 Carswell8C 1267, [2006) B.C.J. No. 1171, [2006) 9 W . W.R. 4 1, SS B.C.L.R. 
(4th) 53, 374 W.A.C. 109, 227 8 .C .A.C. 109, 2006 BCCA 260 (B.C. C.A.); and Ayrton v. 
PRL Financial (Alta.) Lid., 2006 CarswellAlta 319, (2006) A.J. No. 296, 2006 ABCA 88, 
384 A.R. I. 367 W.A.C. I. 26S D.L.R. (4th) 240. (20061 7 W .W.R. 36. S7 Alta. L.R. (4th) 
I, 26 C.P.C. (6th) W3 (Alta. C.A.). 
,,. Scott Andrew Schaaf, "From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending 
Industry" (2001) S N.C. Banking Inst. 339 at 344; Iain Ramsay, "Access to Credit in the 
Alternative Consumer Credit Market" (Paper prepared for Office of Consumer Affairs, 
Industry Canada, February 2000), online: < http://cmcweb.ca/epiclsitelcmc-cmc.nsf/ 
vwapj/ramsay_c.pdf/SFILFJramsay_e.pdf> at 17. 
15 Butler & Park, supra, n. 9 at 123. 
2
• Schaaf, supra, n. 24 at 343. 
27 Ibid., at 346. 
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meet the cost. Pawnbrokers require something to pawn, and borrowing 
from family members may be too embarrassing or difficult.28 Though 
payday lenders do charge a high rate of interest. some have argued that 
they are still cheaper than writing a cheque that is returned dishonoured,29 
and to completely outlaw payday lenders may fon::e this vulnerable 
group to tum to loan sharks and more criminal lenders.30 
Payday lenders are also quick and easy to access, and make minority 
and disenfranchised groups feel more at ease. Sometimes, customers 
will choose payday loans over a bank because they are more friendly 
and accessible, providing more immediate liquidity. 31 Other times, banks 
are just too inconvenient - payday lenders have more flexible hours than 
banks, and better locations.32 For example, in Toronto and Vancouver, 
banks have tended to close more branches in lower income areas, and 
"payday lenders are moving aggressively into this competitive vac-
uum. "33 Payday lenders also make more of an effort to solicit the local 
community than banks, and will often have employees who speak the 
language of the dominant ethnic group of the neighbourhood. 34 
2. THE BUSINESS MODEL FOR PAYDAY LENDERS IN 
CANADA 
The main line of business for payday lenders is, as the name implies, 
making payday loans. Those are typically short-term, single-payment 
loans: The lender agrees to lend the debtor a certain amount of money, 
in return for the promise of repayment (usually on a cheque from the 
debtor, post-dated to the date of his or her next paycheque) and certain 
fees. The fees are typically $15-25 per $100 of loan granted, and are 
fixed without regard to the term of the loan;3' it costs a consumer on 
21 Huckstep, supra, n. 2 at 209. 
29 Schaaf, supra, n. 24 al 344 
)0 Ibid~ at 344. 
, , Ibid .• at 344. 
32 Susan MacDonnell. Losing Ground: Thl Persistent Growth of Family Poverty in Canada's 
Largest City (Toronto: United Way of Greater Toronto, 2007) at 49. 
JJ ACORN report, supra, n. 2 at 15. 
34 Lesly Jean-Paul & Luxman Nathan, "Check Cashers: Moving from the Fringes to the 
financial Mainstream. Communities and Banking" (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
Boston, Mass.), Summer 1999, online: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, < hnp:// 
www.bos.frb.org> at 9. 
35 See Nicole Macintyre, " A Maze of Fast Cash and Fees" Toronto Star (2 NovembeT 2007), 
online: < http:llwww.thestar.com/Newslarticle/279327>. For example. Money Mart. an 
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average $50 to take out a $300 loan for 14 days.36 The average loan is 
about $280 for around a period of 10 days. 37 
The lender determines the creditworthiness of the debtor through 
basic documentation - proof of identity that shows the borrower has 
attained the age of majority and the borrower's address, and proof of a 
steady income and a chequing account. 38 Many payday lenders advertise 
that they do not perform a credit check. 39 ln the case of default, practices 
vary, but few payday lenders will tum to litigation as the loans are for 
small amounts, and the likelihood of enforcing judgment against a de-
faulting payday borrower is low.40 Loans that cannot be recovered are 
written off by lenders as a bad debt expense." Despite the risks in the 
industry, in Canada, the annual profit for payday lenders in 2004 was 
estimated at $1 billion. 42 
Between the costs of bad debt, and the overhead and other costs of 
running a payday lending business, the average Canadian finn incurs a 
cost of $20.66 per $100 of loans.43 However, big loan operators have 
lower costs than smaller "mom-and-pop" operations, and if their market 
share is accounted for in creating a weighted average, t~e average cost 
is only $15.69 per $100 loan.~ 
Naturally, profits per loa.n are higher for repeat customers than for 
first-time borrowers, as the costs of opening a new client file and veri-
fying employment information have already been incurred. The cost of 
"industry leader" according to the Toronto Star, charges $18.94/$1 WI week; Speedy Cash 
charges $25 per $100 borrowed. See also lain Ramsay,·· Access to Credit in the Alternative 
Consumer Credit Market'" (Paper prepared for Office of Consumer Affairs, Industry Can-
ada, February 2000), online: <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/C2-543-
2000E.pdf>, though older suggests !lhe same fees at ii. 
M MacDonnell, supra, n . 32 at 48. .:--
17 "What is a Payday Loan?" (Hamilton: Canadian Payday Loan Association, 2008) online: 
<http://www.cpla-acps.ca/englisti/aboutloans.php>. 
31 See, for example, payday loan providers like Payday Cash Advance Loans ( online: <http:/ 
/www.paydaycashadvanceloans.bi:z/faq.asp>) and Speedy Cash (on line: <http:// 
www .spccdycash.ca/SC-cash·adva~es-payday-loans-howitworks.php> ). 
'" Such as National Cash, (online: < http://www.apaydayloan.ca/ontariopaydayloan.php>) 
and Speedy Cash, (online: < http://www.spcedycash.ca/SC-cash-advances-payday-loans-
howitworks.php> ). 
40 Ramsay, supra, n. 24 at 18. 
•
1 The Cost of Providing Payday Loam in Canada (Ernst & Young: 2004) at 4 ("Ernst & 
Young Report") . 
•
2 MacDonnell , supra. n. 32 at 49. 
"Ernst & Young Repon , supra, n. 41 at 29 . 
.. Ibid., at 31. 
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a new loan is $29 .35 per $100 in a weighted average of payday lenders 
across Canada, while rollover or repeat loans only cost $14.15 in the 
same study.•!! This means that as stores mature and gain more repeat 
business, they become significantly more profitable.46 
Fortunately for payday lenders, the debtors who use payday lenders 
are often repeat customers - Ernst & Young estimated that first-time 
borrowers end up taking out an average of fifteen loans.47 This desire 
for repeat customers can be seen through their behaviour as many payday 
loan companies encourage customer loyalty; one goes as far as offering 
a "no fee" third loan as a bonus for customer loyalty. 48 
In Canada, typical borrowers are either young, single men, or young 
families with children,49 though other studies (commissioned by the 
payday lending industry) have found the average age of borrowers to 
range from 38 in Manitoba to 40 in British Colombia.'° They tend to be 
low-income, but employed, since proof of employment is required for 
many loans." Families with little savings or no credit cards, particularly 
those who had been refused, were significantly more likely to have used 
payday loans.s~ 
Families with outstanding bill or loan payments were more than 
four times as likely to have used payday loans, even after controlling for 
"Ibid., at 7, 34, 36. 
46 See ibid.; see also Chris Robinson, R',egulation of Payday Lending in Canada (ACORN 
Canada: Vancouver, 2006), online: <http://www.acom.org/fileadmin/Centers/Pn:ss/Re-
port/Payday-Lcnding_Canada.pdf#scarch~pcr cent22acorn%C20study%C20payday% 
C201enders%C20canada%22>; see also James Daw, ''Consumer Protection in the Wind 
on Payday Loans" Toronto Star (30 May 2006) at D6 (discussing lhe Robinson report). 
" Cited in MacDonnell, supra, n. 32 at 48. 
" Mcintyre, supra, n. 35. 
49 MacDonnell, supra, n. 32 at 49. The Canadian Survey of Financial Security indicates that 
young families were three times more likely to have used payday loans than !hose aged 3S 
to 44, after controlling for other family characteristics. Sec: <http://www.swcan.ca/eng-
lish/freepub/7S-001-XIEl10407/an- l.htm#Kitcbing>. The Survey of Financial Security 
covered about 5,300 families and collected information on dte assets and debts of families 
and individuals between May and July 2005. 
!O Payday Loon Customer Service - Manitoba (Pollara: 2007) online: Canadian Payday Loan 
Association <http:/lwww.cpla-acps.<:a/english/reportslMB%20Polllra%20Poil%20Sept 
%202007.pdf> at 3, Payday Loan Customer Service - British Columbia (Pollara: 2007) 
online: Canadian Payday Loan ASS<>Ciation <http://www.cpla-11cps.ca/english/rcportsl 
3631 %20BC%20CPLA ~20Report%20FINAL %20(0ct%2026).pdf> at 3. 
51 MacDonnell. supra. n. 32 at 49. 
52 See < http://www.statcan.calcnglish/freepub/75-00 J. XIFJI 0407 /art- I .htrn#Kitching>. 
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other key characteristics such as income and savings. 53 Four in ten 
families who borrowed money through payday loans had spending that 
eJC;ceeded income, substantially more than families who had not used 
payday loans.~ Almost half of families who used payday loans had no 
one to tum to if they faced financial difficulty. 55 More than one-quarter 
reported that they could not handle an unforeseen expenditure of $500, 
and nearly half could not handle one of $5,000.36 
Payday lenders have primarily retail store locations, "tucked in 
between variety and convenience store outlets. "57 Their main appeal is 
that they provide cash instantly, without a hold period, and that they are 
"non-judgmental" and friendlier than banks; often, payday lenders will 
ensure they have employees who speak the language of the local com-
munity to increase their appeal.~8 That these business choices make a 
difference to borrowers can be seen through a recent survey of payday 
users in Ontario conducted on behalf of the Canadian Payday Lending 
Association, the majority of whom stated that they used payday lenders 
because they are quick and easy.~9 
Payday lenders are not a homogenous group. There are a few larger 
chains, and a number of smaller providers, some of which are being 
acquired by national chains (and have been since 2000),w and not every 
payday lender is structured the same way. There is the traditional model, 
where the payday loan outlet is lending its own money. There is also the 
broker model, where the payday lender covers the overhead costs, but 
is lending out a third party's money; the third party bears the risk of a 
loan default. Finally, in the insurance model, the lender charges a fixed 
fee for the loans, and an additional insurance premium charge which is 
designed to cover the costs of the loan and the risk of a default; the 
» /bid. 
••Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
" MacDonncll, supra, n. 32 at 43. 
" Ibid .. at 49; Ramsay. !lupra. n. 24 at 17. 
19 Payday Loan CU!ltomt r Service - Ontario (Pollara: 2007) online: Canadian Payday Loan 
Association, < http://www.cpla-acps.ca/cnglish/rcports/3631 %200ntario%20CPLA %20 
Rcport%20FINAL%20(0ct%2026).[pdf> at 11 and15. 
"" Ramsay, supra, n. 24 at ii. 
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insurance company which assumes this fee is usually owned by the same 
payday loan operator.6 ' 
3. THE REGULATORY SCHEME GOVERNING PAYDAY 
LENDERS 
(a) Federal Legislation 
The main federal legislation governing payday lenders is found in 
s. 347 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits entering into arrangements 
or receiving payment of interest at a criminal rate.62 A criminal rate is 
defined as any interest rate of over 60 per cent per annum; interest 
includes all charges and expenses, such as fees or penalties, but not 
official fees or overdraft charges, for example.63 However, that legisla-
tion was drafted to aid police in prosecutions of loan sharks: rather than 
as consumer protection legislation. 64 There have been two attempts to 
change the status of the section federally and make it more directed 
towards payday lenders. The first, Bill S-19, failed due to an election.65 
Bill C-26, however, came into force after receiving Royal Assent on 
May 3, 2007. The Bill defines payday loans as "an advancement of 
money in exchange for a post-dated cheque, a preauthorized debit or a 
future payment of a similar nature but not for any guarantee, suretyship, 
overdraft protection or security on property and not through a margin 
loan, pawnbroking, a line of credit or a credit card. ' 066 It then exempts 
payday loans for under $1500 and for fewer than 62 days from the scope 
of the Criminal Code, allowing for provincial regulation of the area, if 
the province exercises its option to regulate under the new s. 347. I (3).67 
••Ernst& Young Repon, supra, n. 41 at7. 
61 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. s. 347(1). 
63 Ibid .• s. 347(2). 
64 Mary Anne Waldron, "Section 347 of the Criminal Code: •A Deeply Problematic Law"' 
(Paper presented lO the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, August 2003) online: <http:/ 
/www.ulcc.ca/enlpoam21Section-347-Criminal-Code.pdf> at para 2-3, 11 . 
.. Jennifer Babe, "Section 347 of the Criminal Code of Canada: Business Law Problems 
Remain" (Paper presented to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, September 2007) at 
4. 
66 Criminal Codt, supra, n. 23, s. 347.1(1) 
67 Ibid., ss. 347. I (2) and (3). See also the testimony of federal officials before House and 
Senate Committees during Parliamentary consideration of C-26, online: < http:// 
cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/ComrnineePublicatlon.aspx?COM = I 0476&Sourceld = 188~80&: 
SwitchLanguage= I > and < http://www.parl.gc.ca.38.1.parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/ 
banlc-e/16eva-e.htm?Language=E&P:arl =39&.Ses=l&com~=3>. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Essentially, the province must regulate to protect payday borrowers, at 
which point the Governor in Council will designate the province under 
the section, or allow it to "opt-out." 
Some provinces have subsequently taken steps to regulate payday 
lenders, though a few still have not. The provinces that have not yet 
attempted to regulate payday lenders are: Newfoundland and Labrador, 
the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon (though there possible 
amendments are under review). The other provinces all have regulation, 
either in force or pending. 
(b) Provincial Legislation 
(i) Overview 
The following is an overview of the recent provincial efforts to 
regulate payday lenders. The chart found in Appendix A provides a 
detailed comparison of the provincial regulation. Bill C-26 provides 
some direction as to what is required under the provincial regulation, 
however, it leaves room for the provinces to be designated and opt out 
of the federal regime with different approaches to regulation. Bill C-26 
requires a licensing or other type of authorization system for lenders, 
the establishment of limits on the total cost of borrowing, and a frame-
work of protections for consumers. In seeking to fit within the Bill C-
26 requirements for designation, the following five components are 
provided for in most provinces' legislation, although there is variation 
among the provinces in how this is done: 
a. Interest Rate Caps: Each province's regulation gives ei-
ther the province, through regulation, or a body, such as the 
Energy Commission, the ability to set an interest rate cap. 
With the exception of Quebec, which has set its interest rate 
cap at 35 per cent, and Manitoba, which has set the maxi-
mum at $ 17 per $ 100 loaned, without regard to the term of 
the loan (with certain exceptions). The other provinces have 
not yet set interest rate caps. 
b. Cancellation Protection: One to two business days is pro-
vided by each province for borrower cancellation rights. 
c. Information in Agreement: There is variation among the 
provinces. Some provinces require disclosure of the cost of 
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the loan and how this is done varies. Other provinces only 
require a statement that the loan is a high cost loan. 
d. Rollover Prohibitions: Each province prohibits rollovers 
or charging an additional fee for a rollover. 
e. Licensing: Each province requires licensing of payday 
lenders and the requirements for licensing range from pay-
ment of a fee to sample loan documents. The licensor diffe.rs 
from province to province. 
f. Posted Warning: With the exception of one province that 
has the ability to regulate this and has not done so and 
another province that does not provide for this component 
of the legislation, all provinces require disclosure of the cost 
of credit. One province requires disclosure that indicates 
the loans are high cost loans. 
g. Remedies: Remedies range from an administrative penalty 
of up to $10,000 to not being required to pay any amount 
over the principal amount borrowed. 
(ii) Alberta 
In their 2007 budget, the government of Alberta designated as one 
of its goals the reform of the Fair Trading Act to address marketplace 
issues around payday lenders.68 It intends to regulate payday lenders 
through regulations passed pursuant to that Act. but it is still in consul-
tations at this point. 
(iii) British Columbia 
In British Columbia, the B ill69 to regulate payday lenders was given 
royal assent on November 22, '2007 and amends the Business Practices 
and Consumer Protection (Payday Loans) Amendment Act.10 The Bill 
adds a Part 6.1 to the Business Practices and Consumer Act, with the 
title of "Payday Loans." This part allows the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council to set a maximum cost for payday loans and requires payday 
.. "Budget 2007: Goal 2" (Government of Albena: 2007) online: Ministry of Finance < http:/ 
/www.finance.gov .ab.ca/publicationslbudgetlbudget2007 /scrvicc.....ab.html >. 
6t Bill 27, Business Practices and Consumer Protection (Payday Loans) Amendment Act, 3d 
Sess .. 38th Parl .. British Columbia. 2007. 
70 S.B.C. 2004, c. 2. 
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lenders to be licensed. 71 It also sets out a host of rights for payday loan 
consumers, including the right to cancel the loan before the end of the 
subsequent day or if it does not satisfy the written notice requirements;12 
sets out clear disclosure requirements;73 and prohibits rollovers and 
second loans while loans already exist. 74 Licensing and compliance 
enforcement will be administered by the Business Practices and Con-
sumer Protection Authority, a not-for-profit organization that operates 
at ann's length from government. 
(iv) Manitoba 
After the changes to the Criminal Code, Manitoba made changes 
to the Consumer Protection Act1~ through the Consumer Protection 
Amendment Act (Payday Loans).16 These changes require licensing for 
payday lenders, and require them to give warnings to their customers 
about the costs of borrowing. The Act also authorizes the Manitoba 
Public Utility Board to set out a maximum cost of credit for payday 
loans, and prohibits additional fees on renewals, extensions, or new loans 
to replace old loans, unless otherwise authorized by the Board. The new 
Act also prohibits signing over of future wages and title loans, and gives 
the right to cancel a loan within 48 hours without penalty. Finally, the 
Manitoba Consumers Bureau has the right to inspect licensed premises, 
and to access unlicensed operations if there is evidence that payday loans 
are being made there. 77 
Pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act, Manitoba has drafted the 
Payday Loans Regulation. 18 This regulation specifies the licensing pro-
cess and bonding requirements for payday lenders, and stipulates the 
information that must be in a loan agreement.79 It also requires payday 
lenders to post signs with clear warnings that "payday loans are high 
cost loans" and other information about the costs of payday lenders. 80 
11 Ibid., s. 112.02. 
12 Ibid., s. 112.05. 
" Ibid., s. I 12.06. 
74 Ibid., s. I 12.08(1 X a) and (b ) . 
1s C.C.S.M. c. C-200. 
76 S.M. 2006, c. 31. 
77 
"Province Announces Next Steps in Payday Loan Regulation" online: Government of 
Manitoba, <http://news.gov.mb.ca/newslindex.html?archive=2007-6-0I &item= 1751 >. 
11 Man. Reg. 9912007. 
'
0 Ibid., s. 14. 
•
0 Ibid .• s. 16(3). 
338 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [23 B.F.L.R.] 
Section 147( l) of the Consumer Protection Act also provides the Man-
itoba Public Utilities Board with the ability to set a limit on the costs of 
credit given by payday lenders. The Board set the maximum at $17 per 
$100 loaned without regard to the term of the loan (with a number of 
nuances for special situations and for loans about $500) on April 4, 
2008.81 
(v) New Brunswick 
In New Brunswick, Bill 4, An Act Respecting Payday Loans,82 
passed the second reading as of December 12, 2007. Like the other 
provinces, the Bill is designed to protect payday borrowers through 
licensing and bonding requirements for payday lenders,83 informational 
requirements on the payday loan itself (including all fees and penalties 
charged),114 no-fee cancellation options,85 posted information about the 
cost of loans,86 and it grants the government the ability to limit the cost 
of credit.87 
(vi) Nova Scotia 
The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board is currently in consul-
tations to determine the limits to be set on payday lending. To that end, 
they held public hearings in January 2008 to consider preliminary issues 
including the maximum cost of borrowing and the maximum fees or 
rates that could be charged by payday lenders. 88 
The authority to embark on these consultations was granted by the 
Consumer Protection Act (amended), which received Royal Assent on 
November 23, 2006. 89 Sections I 8A-18U of that Act provide for similar 
11 Consumer Protection Act, supra, n. 75, Part XVIII. The interest rate cap was introduced 
by the Manitoba Public Utilitie s Board Act Order 39/08 online: < http:// 
www.pub.gov.mb.ca/pdflmisc/39-08.pdf>. 
12 2nd Sess .• S6dt Parl .. New Brunswick, 2007. This Bill will amend the Cost of Credit 
Disclosure Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-28.3. 
13 Ibid., SS. 37.12; 37. lS. 
14 Ibid., ss. 37.28(2Xm) . 
.. Ibid., s. 37.29. 
16 Ibid., s. 37.3. 
" Ibid .• s. 37.3 1. 
11 Nova Scotia Utilities Review Board, "Payday Loans, Notice of Public Hearings" onlinc: 
Canadian Payday Loan Association < http://www.cpla-acps.ca/engl ish/reports/NS%20-
Payday-1..oanS-Notice.pdf>. 
19 S .N.S., 2006, c.25. 
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protections to all other provinces. There is a permit requirement for 
payday lenders.90 infonnational requirements in the loan agreement.91 
and cancellation provisions.92 The Act also grants the Nova Scotia Util-
ities and Review Board the ability to set a maximum cost of borrowing 
and other controls.93 
(vii) Ontario 
In Ontario, amendments to the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 
requiring greater disclosure by payday lenders are already in effect. They 
pertain to the posting of a disclosure poster that must indicate certain 
pieces of information. For instance, payday lenders must display the 
cost per hundred dollars of the loans they grant. They also require that 
payday lenders display the cost of a "$300 loan over a period of 14 
days."94 Further changes also require a standard form for payday loans 
which will also provide greater information to the consumer.9~ 
Most recently, on March 31, 2008 the Government announced Bill 
48: Payday Loans Act,96 which will be in addition to the provisions in 
the Consumer Protection Act, 2002. It requires all payday lenders and 
brokers to be licensed and establishes a Registrar to inspect lenders and 
enforce provisions under the Act.97 The Act seeks to protect borrowers 
by prohibiting lenders from making misleading claims about the total 
cost of borrowing.98 It also provides for a two-day cancellation period 
where the borrower can cancel the loan agreement and pay back the 
advance.99 The lender is forced to return all documents and fees pertain-
ing to the cost of borrowing, without penalty. The Act also provides for 
very broad regulations pertaining to the specific responsibilities of li-
censees, governing their activities, setting limits that payday lenders and 
90 Ibid., SS. ISC-G. 
" /bid. , ss. 181·N. 
92 Ibid., s. ISQ. 
93 Ibid .. s. !ST. 
94 0. Reg. 17/05 as am by 0. Reg. 187 /fJl 61. I . According to 61. I there is no requirement to 
have the APR disclosed on the poster, the only requirement is that it is disclosed in the loan 
agreement itself. 
., Ibid., s. 62 . I . 
96 Bill 48. Payday Loans Act. I st Sess .• 39th Part. . Ontario. 2008 (first reading on March 31. 
2008). 
97 Ibid., s. S. 
'" Ibid., s. 26( I). 
"" Ibid., s. 30( I). 
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brokers may charge and governing the required contents for payday loan 
agreements. 100 Remedies include: a rebate on the cost of borrowing for 
borrowers who entered into agreements not consistent with the Act, 
freezing of assets of delinquent lenders, 101 and the imposition of admin-
istrative penalties not exceeding $10,000. 102 
Finally, the Act established a special fund, known as the Ontario 
Payday Lending Education Fund (OPLEF), to educate borrowers about 
their rights under the Act. 103 The OPLEF will be a non-profit corporation 
and will be funded in part by the payday lenders and brokers. The OPLEF 
is required to report on its activities and administration through an annual 
report to the Minister who will then deposit the report with the Assem-
bly .1°' Ontario is the only province to include an educational component 
in its legislation. 
The Minister hailed the new legislation as an attempt to balance 
protecting consumers while supporting a legitimate industry to continue 
to grow. io5 When pressed on why the legislation does not contain a clear 
unambiguous interest rate cap, the Minister said more information was 
required. He established an independent expert panel, representing busi-
ness and poverty activists, to examine the rate cap and report at a later 
date.106 
A number of Members of Parliament, such as Andrea Horwath, 
have already criticized the Bill as not going far enough to protect con-
sumers.107 She believes that an interest rate cap should be clearly in-
cluded in the Bill as well as a 30 day "cooling-off' period for rescis-
sion.108 Another Member of Parliament, Cheri DiNovo, states that "we 
don't need payday lenders. Payday lenders are usurious. These are un-
100 Ibid. . s. 77. 
IOI Ibid .. s. S2( I). 
102 Ibid. , s. S9( 1)-(3). 
IQl Ibid .• s. 66-67. 
1<>< Ibid., s. 74. 
"
11 Interview of Government Services Minister Ted McMeckin, (I April 2008) on Me1ro 
Morning, CBC Radio, Toronto, CBC Radio Archives. 
'°" Ibid. 
"" First Reading of Bill 48, Debates and Proceedings, March 3 1, 2008 < http:// 
www.ontla.on.ca/weMtousc-~ngslhousc....detail.do?Date = 200S.-03-
3J&.Parl= 39&.Sess= J&locale= en#PARAl 39>. 
IOI Ibid. 
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necessary services and they leech off the poor."109 Howard Hampton, 
leader of the provincial NOP Party, called the legislation superficial and 
criticized the government as being "scared" to put the payday loan 
industry out of business with an interest rate cap.110 
Representatives from ACORN Canada (Association of Community 
Organizations for Reform Now) again stresSect the importance of an 
interest rate cap - "It's either going to protect people and keep money 
from getting sucked out of low-income neighbourhoods or not, depend-
ing on what the interest rate is."111 Other poverty activists stressed the 
need for education that would actually find its way to the most vulnerable 
consumers. 112 They recommend starting education campaigns in payday 
locations or through different anti-poverty groups. However, poverty 
activists were quick to note that the education can only go so far when 
consumers are also placed with crushing time pressures in paying back 
the loan within several days.113 The Canadian Payday Loan Association 
("CPLA") remains silent on the new legislation, as of April 1, 2008. 
However, in an interview CPLA President Stan Keyes applauded the 
Bill as a right balance. 114 Keyes refused to comment on an "interest rate 
cap based on APR", calling it a meaningless number.• u However, he 
does support the use of fee caps of between $20-23 per $ t 00 loan. 116 
(viii) Prince Edward Island 
PEl's Bill 100, Payday Loans Act, has not yet moved past the first 
reading, which occurred in the spring 2006 legislative session. 117 How-
ever, if passed, the Bill will implement many of the same changes seen 
in the other provinces, including licensing, 118 maximum cost of credit, 119 
109 Joanna Smith and Robert Benzie. "Payday loan crackdown" Toronto Star (April I . 2008). 
on line: The Star < http:/lwww.thestar.com/News/Ontario/article/4078 I 3>. 
110 Supra. n. 16. 
111 Supra, n. 20. 
112 Interview of Miryam Zcballos, ( I April 2008) on Metro Morning, CBC Radio, T oronto, 
CBC Radio Archives. 
113 lbUJ. 
11
• Supra, n. 16. 
115 lbUJ. 
116 fbid. 
117 4lh Sess., 62nd Parl .. Prince Edward Island, 2007. 
"' Ibid., s. 10. 
119 /bUJ., s. 11. 
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getting appropriate information to the consumer, 120 and penalty-free 
cancellation within the first 48 hours. 121 
(ix) Quebec 
Quebec's Consumer Protection Act requires that a lender have a 
license to operate there, and courts have decided to only grant licenses 
if the creditor charges less than 35 per cent interest rate, because the 
loan is otherwise unconscionable under s. 8 and so can be denied under 
s. 325.122 There are no payday lenders legally operating in Quebec. 123 
(x) Saskatchewan 
Like the other provinces that have sought to regulate payday lend-
ers, Saskatchewan provides similar protections to borrowers in the prov-
ince. An Act Respecting Payday Loan Agreements, Payday Lenders and 
Borrowers received royal assent and came into effect in May 2007 .124 It 
has licensing requirements for lenders,•~ disclosure requirements for 
the protection of borrowers through public signage126 and the credit 
agreement, 127 and allows the province to set a maximum rate for credit. 128 
However, again, the maximum has not yet been set by regulation. 
(c) Self-regulation by Payday Lenders 
The CPLA is the largest Canadian association of payday lenders, 
and claims to represent 500 of the 1350 payday lending stores in Can-
ada. 129 It claims that its Code of Best Business Practices ("Code") is 
recognized as the "world's toughest voluntary code of conduct," and it 
ilO Ibid., s. 12. 
121 Ibid., s. 13. 
l22 R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, SS. 8, 325. 
123 Government of Ontario, .. New Payday Lending Rules Now in Effect Across Ontario .. 
online: Ministry of Government and Consumer Services < http://ogov.newswire.ca/on 
tariclOPOFJ2007/08/01/c2939.htm171match=&.lang=_e.htrnl>. 
124 2007, c. P-4.3. 
1
" Ibid., Part II. 
126 Ibid., s. 2 1. 
tn Ibid., s. 18. 
IJa Ibid .• s. 23. 
1:19 Office of the Ethics and Integrity Commissioner, "Annual Report 2()()6.2007" {Canadian 
Payday Loan Association: Hamilton, 2008) online: <http://www.cplaethicscommis 
sioner.ca/english/pdf/OElc_cPLA-AnnualReporL0607.pdf> [ .. Annual Repo11·1. 
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has recently set up a Commissioner of Ethics and Integrity, whose job 
it is to independently enforce the practices in the Code.130 
The Code, first and foremost, prohibits rollover loans, which are 
widely decried by industry critics. 13 ' In doing so, it specifically bars 
members from granting loan extensions for a fee, or from advancing a 
new loan to pay down an existing loan. The Code also prohibits multiple 
loans in excess of the initial amount the lender was approved for, and 
prevents lenders from taking collateral. Funher, it sets a limit on the 
amount a member may charge on the default of the loan, and only allows 
lenders to charge post-maturity interest at a rate of $0.90/week for the 
first 13 weeks, and $0.50 per week thereafter. 
Members are also required to recommend credit counselling to any 
customer who has defaulted twice within a year, and offer to forego 
accrual of interest for customers who do go into counselling. There are 
also restrictions on the type of loans that a member may offer-a member 
may not give a loan based on some social assistance payments or take 
an assignment of wages, neither may they grant a loan over $1500 or a 
loan for a term of over 31 days. 
The Code also has similar requirements to many of the provinces' 
proposed or enacted legislation, in allowing no-penalty cancellation of 
the loan if done by the end of the next business day. It also stipulates 
that the member should disclose to the customer the "high-cost nature 
of the payday loan on all Joan documentation." 132 Notably, however, the 
one area that the Code does not touch on is the amount that can be 
charged in fees and interest (until maturity) on loans. 
This Code is enforced by the Office of Ethics and Integrity Com-
missioner, a position funded by CPLA but designed to operate indepen· 
' '" "Canadian Payday Loan Association Appoints Former Law Enforcement Oftkial Sid 
Peckford Ethics and Integrity Co:mmissioncr~ (RTO Online: 2006) online: < http:/! 
www .rtoonline.com/Contentf Articlc/May06'CanadianPaydayloanAS$0CiationAppoints 
PickfordEthics()S0406.asp>. 
131 ''Code of Best Business Practices" (Canadian Payday Loan Association: Hamilton, 2008) 
on line: < http:/fwww.cpla-acps.ca/english/consumcrcodc.php>. Recall that in most "hor-
ror stories" about payday loans in the press, the journalist will give the example of a person 
who got a rollover loan and ended up making payments for months without paying down 
the initial loan because the loan was rolled over. 
"' Ibid. 
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dently. 133 Any complaints about a violation of the Code are made via a 
1-800 number staffed by a full time Compliance Officer who will de-
termine which prospective viQlations require further action, and will 
make submissions with recommendations on each violation for the Com-
missioner. The Commissioner then has the mandate to investigate and 
follow-up on any violations brought to his attention; he also has the 
ability to issue warnings, or fine or otherwise discipline members who 
have not complied with the Code. In 2007, 164 complaints were made 
via the 1-800 number or email~ 87 were deemed to merit further inves-
tigation; in 16 cases the Commissioner concluded a violation occurred; 
10 members were sanctioned and the other 6 responded with a "satis-
factory resolution" to the matter. 13' 
4. CALLING ON CANADIAN PAYDAY LENDERS 
On March 22 and March 28, 2008, a female student research assis-
tant, along with a male research partner visited 4 different payday lenders 
in downtown Toronto. In two cases, two locations of the payday lender 
were visited, totaling 6 visits. The research assistant who conducted the 
visits is a third year Osgoode Hall Law School student who is white, in 
her mid-twenties, has worked with the author on payday lending research 
for over three months, and has seven years of post-secondary education. 
Her male friend, a third year medical student, is also white and in his 
mid-twenties. 
The instruction provided to the student was to obtain all the infor-
mation that she could about how much it would cost to obtain a payday 
loan and what she was required to do in order to obtain the loan. The 
student has asked that her identity be kept anonymous as she is joining 
a law firm upon graduation from law school that represents a major 
player in the payday lending industry. 
(a) Ontario Disclosure Requirements for Payday Lenders 
Section 61.1(4) of the Coruumer Protection Act requires the fol-
lowing statements: 
m "About the Office of the Ethics and Integrity Commissioner" (Canadian Payday Loan 
Association: Hamilton, 2008) online: < http://www.cplaethicscommissioner.ca/english/ 
about.html>. 
'"' Annual Report, supra, n. 129 at 7. 
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1. Total Cost of Borrowing per each $100 as heading (larger 
font) . 
2. Subheading indicating "$300 loan for 14 days" (smaller 
fom). 
3. "Principal Amount $300.00" AND "Total Cost of Borrow-
ing" followed by the total cost of borrowing per each $300 
advanced under the agreement. 
4 . Horizontal line. 
5. "Total to Repay". 
6. "This sign conforms to the disclosure requirements under 
the CPA". 
The visits to the payday lenders indicated that most of the required 
tenns were provided as per statutory requirements, however, payday 
lenders' interpretation of the tenns varied widely. The following table 
highlights the difficulty in trying to ascertain how much each loan cost 
and to compare the cost of borrowing as between the diff erentn lenders. 
Table 1 
Disclosure Money Cash Cash Shop Cash Store 
.Require- Mart Money 
men ts 
Total Cost of $1.78 and $20.00 $20.00 $22.26 
Borrowing $19.45 with *($100 in-
per $100 optional eludes a$20 
(larger font) cheque broker fee.) 
cashing 
fees. 
"Example: No number $60.00 No number No number 
$300 loan for included. included. included. 
14 days" 
(smaller 
font). 
"Principal $300.00 $300.00 $300.00 $300.00 
Amount". 
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''Total Cost $5.34 $20.00 per $60.00 $66.79 
of Borrow- $100 bor-
ing". rowed. 
$60.00 per 
$300 bor-
rowed. 
''Total to Re- $305.34 $360.00 $360.00 $306.79 
pay". * Does not 
reflect the 
net amount 
received; re-
fleets the 
gross 
amountbor-
rowed. 
"This sign Included. Included. Included. Included. 
confonns to 
the disclosure 
requirements 
under the 
CPA". 
*This statement is printed on the Cash Store's Disclosure Poster 
(b) Visits to 6 Toronto Payday Lenders 
At each location, the student asked the following five questions. 
The responses below are in her language. She relied on her research 
panner to aid with data collection. He would enter the store after she 
had left (or as she was leaving) and collect any promotional material 
they might have had. After her departure from two of the six locations, 
the store employee commented, without prompting, to the rest of indi-
viduals in the store on ' how many questions' she had asked, and that it 
was 'funny' for her to want to write things down. These statements 
clearly indicate that the student's haphazard way of collecting infor-
mation was, in comparison to other payday borrowers, quite exceptional. 
1. Whal is a payday loan? 
Most operators replied that a payday loan is a short-term loan. They 
would provide me with a certain amount of money, which I am 
' 
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expected to pay back on my next payday. This was usually about I 0 
days, but could be extended or reduced depending on the next time I 
would get paid. 
2. What do I need to provide to qualify for a payday loan? 
The following documents were required for me to apply for a loan. 
But, it was not a guarantee of whether or not I'd be accepted. The 
employees assured me that qualifying would take less then I 0 
minutes. But when I asked what the process would involve (i.e. calling 
employers etc. ) they didn't answer but instead refocused my attention 
on how fast it would be. 
Money Mart: A current bank statement; latest pay stub; post-dated 
personal cheque. 
Cash Money: Pay stub; personal cheque; bank statement (from today 
or the day before). 
Cash Shop: Proof of continuous employment at the same job for six 
months; get paid through direct deposit; no more then I Non Suffi-
cient Fund fee in the past 2 months,· 2 pay stubs; 2 pieces of ID; a 
utility/phone bill; an updated bank statement for the last 45 days. 
Cash Store: a current bank statement,· latest pay stub; personal 
cheque; utility bill; personal references (family members who had 
landlines were preferred). 
3. What is the most money I could get? 
All locations began by stipulating that I could get approved for up 
to 50% of my net salary. Cash Shop said that since "I looked ok" 
they would be able to go up to 70%. Cash Money also said that they 
could go up to 70% for repeat customers who had a 'positive rela-
tionship' with Cash Money. 
4. How much does it cost to borrow? 
Each employee pointed to the poster and proceeded to read the poster 
to me. When I asked specifically what the terms 'cost of borrowing' 
and 'total to repay' meant, they declined to answer. 
The Term 'Total Cost of Borrowing' varies widely from $5.34 and 
$66.79. Furthermore Cash Money's use of the term is confusing by 
stating the $20.00 first, even though the example asks for the $300 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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example - which would then be $60.00. 
The term 'Total to Repay' is also widely misinterpreted. You can see 
that Cash Money and Cash Shop are relatively straightforward, the 
consumer should repay $360.00 and one could assume that would 
be the total written on my post-dated cheque or direct transfer form. 
However, Money Mart and Cash Store indicate substantially lower 
levels of 'Total to Repay'. But these totals do not include the broker-
age and optional cheque cashing fees, which are in most cases man-
datory charges. 
At Cash Store, I was told that the brokerage fees were mandatory, 
and were due to the fact that the Cash Store 'linked, me, the borrower 
with an independent lender'. Cash Store did not actually lend me the 
money themselves. I still do not know what total I would be required 
to write on my post-dated cheque. 
The optional cheque cashing fees employed by Money Mart were the 
most confusing. All their advertising indicates that they charge 59% 
interest, or about 90 cents/week per 100 dollar loan. However the 
advertising also seems to indicate that there is an 'optional' cheque 
cashing fee. Upon prompting, the store employee told me that if I 
paid back the loan in full on the loan due date (the day before my 
payday) I would pay the advertised rates. However, if I waited until 
payday, Money Mart would cash my cheque and charge an extra 
$19.95 per JOO dollars. This was seen as a convenience fee, and the 
employee stressed this was optional - kind of like valet parking. 
However, I find it very difficult to believe how someone who has 
limited income, and took out a loan in the first place, would then be 
able to pay it off BEFORE they receive their regular salary. Thus the 
vast majority of borrowers are forced to pay this convenience fee. 
I'm also concerned with the widespread use of the word 'AND' as 
opposed to 'PLUS'. While it's a small change (and not illegal) I don't 
think it conveys to the consumer that they are also responsible for 
this charge. 
5. Can I get a copy of the information? 
Once they began providing details, I would ask if they had any 
information written down. They usually had written information per-
taining to the materials I needed to bring in to qualify for a loan. 
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However, none of the information about prices was written down, 
although they did let me copy the information on the poster down by 
hand when I prompted. I clandestinely took the photos with my cell 
phone. 
I was able to get two loan applications. On Cash Shop's application 
there appears to be a statement about wage assignment-which is 
not legal in Ontario. [Pursuant to The Wages Act, 1990, payday 
lenders are prohibited from taking wage assignments under subsec-
tion 7(7), which states that an assignment of wages to secure payment 
of a debt is invalid. In addition, a representation that such assignments 
are valid may be considered a false, misleading or deceptive repre-
sentation under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002.] 
6. What if I can't pay the loan back? 
On both the Cash Store and Money Mart's website it clearly says 
that no rollovers are permitted. 
The Cash Shop indicated that if I couldn't pay off the loan that they 
would be able to renegotiate something with me. Cash Store also 
said that I must pay off the loan, but if I thought that there was no 
other way . then I was supposed to come into the store and talk to 
them before my next payday. 
Cash Money also indicated that I would have to pay off the loan on 
my next payday. But if I was in dire circumstances they would wait 
one or two days before cashing the cheque. The Cash Money em-
ployee also said that I should consider using the 'pick up' option to 
pay off my loan. If I come in on my payday (not the day before) and 
pay my loan in full, in cash, then they would immediately loan me 
the same amount of my previous loan. This, she indicated, was con-
sidered a new loan and I would have to pay new fees associated with 
taking out a loan. The Cash Money employee said the vast majority 
of individuals preferred the pick-up option. 
I thought it was rather odd that people would want to go through the 
trouble of going to the payday loan, rather then letting the cheque 
clear, since at Cash Money there is no cheque cashing convenience 
fee. In other words, it would cost the same to pick up the loan or to 
let the cheque clear. She said that if individuals waited 2 or 3 days 
for the cheque to clear, they would not be able to take out another 
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loan (since borrowers are only allowed one loan at a time). With the 
pick-up option, they could take out the new loan on the same day. 
One could assume therefore, that not only is this pick-up option a 
rollover, but that the majority of borrowers rely upon them. 
Even Money Mart, who prohibits rollovers under the CPLA Best 
Practices, stated I could apply for a 'back-to-back' loan. If I had 
enough funds to clear the first cheque, Money Mart would immedi-
ately loan me the exact amount that was just cleared from my account. 
While not technically a rollover, the risk of debt spiral would still be 
present-as I would never have enough money to clear the loan and 
provide for myself for the next two weeks. Money Mart would also 
receive new fees from my 'back-to-back' loan every two weeks. For 
example, if I pursued 'back-to-back' loans for one year (26 loans) 
on a principal amount of $300 I would pay roughly $60 in interest 
every two weeks. In this case, Money Mart would receive over $1,560 
in interest (520% APR), for a $300 loan. 
The student reports the following conclusion regarding her expe-
rience in attempting to get a payday loan and the relevant information: 
I found it very difficult to determine how much the loan would ulti-
mately cost me. I am therefore quite adamant in saying that the 
average payday loan consumer may not know how much they are 
paying for their loan when they sign the agreement, nor are they fully 
capable of 'shopping around' to find the best deal. 
I am even more convinced of my conclusion when one thinks that all 
payday loan borrowers, through the act of looking for a loan, are 
already under financial stress and will not be in the more contem-
plative state-of-mind I was experiencing. (i.e., I didn't actually need 
the loan to pay for groceries, facing the risk of eviction etc. ) The 
stress of 'getting the money now' would drastically impair one's 
ability to effectively compute the highly complicated and intentionally 
confusing information associated with payday loans. 
5. AMERICAN REGULATORY LESSONS 
In contrast to the more mature American payday lending industry, 
and accompanying attempts at regulation, the Canadian payday lending 
industry is new and until fairly recently has been unregulated. Accord-
ingly, this section reviews the dominant American approaches taken to 
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regulate payday lenders with a view to drawing regulatory lessons for 
the Canadian context. 
(a) Disclosure 
Throughout history, methods of calculating interest and creating 
the terms of credit contracts were notoriously inconsistent. m This be-
came more problematic after the Second World War with the exponential 
increase of moderately-priced consumer goods being bought on credit 
by the middle-class.•:16 Arguably, this new consumer group Jacked the 
expertise and patience necessary for appreciating the true meaning of 
their rights and responsibilities pursuant to a credit contract. In essence, 
consumers rarely understood the actual price they were paying for goods. 
As a result, the federal government in the United States enacted the Truth 
In Lending Act (TILA) in 1968. Creditors were required to calculate and 
publish uniform interest rates. 137 With a uniform rate, consumers would 
be able to quickly determine the 'price tag' and 'shop around' for the 
best deal to suit their needs. There were two main disclosure elements. 
The first was a 'finance charge' which equaled the sum of all charges 
payable (directly or indirectly) by the creditor for extending the credit.138 
The second was the APR, which is a measure of the cost of credit, 
expressed as a yearly rate.139 The Act gave debtors the right to sue 
creditors if they did not provide these uniform disclosures. In extreme 
cases, non-complying creditors could face criminal prosecution. The 
Act was later amended in 1980 to respond to different criticisms from 
both lenders and borrowers. 
Christopher Peterson notes that disclosure has remained the 'cor-
nerstone' tool against predatory lending in the United States.140 Its value 
stems from the ability to reduce the information asymmetries that pro-
vided an undue advantage to creditors, while maintaining the integrity 
and efficiency of markets. It is also seen as the least paternalistic, and 
most consistent with a free market economy, of the tools, as it provides 
us Peterson, supra, n. 17. 
'"' Ibid., at 865. 
m Ibid., at 8~. 
"" Diane Hellwig, ~Exposing the Loan shark in Sheep' s Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the 
Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense" (2005) 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1567 
at 1592. 
139 Ibid . 
.. ., Supra, n. 17 at 89 1. 
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freedom for customers to contract necessary terms for themselves. Dis-
closure also allows legitimate lenders to continue to operate their busi-
nesses without anificially lowering interest rates or prohibiting certain 
controversial practices. On this basis, Peterson argues that disclosure 
might be the tool which holds the most promise. 141 While he admits that 
Tll.A does not hold up to expectations, he believes it can be reformed. 
Essential in this reform is re-conceptualizing disclosure as helping the 
customer 'understand' the credit tenns instead of the current objective 
of merely 'presenting' credit tenns to consumers.142 
Other scholars, however, have criticized Tll.A's structural defi-
ciencies. Such scholars believe that the disclosures mandated in the Act 
are not very useful to consumers. For instance, the APR does not include 
many fees that lenders normally charge, and lenders themselves calculate 
the APR inconsistently. " 3 This, according to Matthew Edwards, "means 
that a creditor's APR might both understate the total cost of credit in an 
absolute sense and impair comparison shopping between providers of 
credit."144 Second, TILA has been questioned since it conceptualizes 
interest as a percentage. Ronald Mann argues that this goes against the 
' street smans' of most people, s ince they compute interest in dollars.1' 5 
Diane Hellwig agrees noting that "converting dollars to percentages and 
back again may present a challenge, especially when rates are subject to 
change."146 Forcing consumers to look at the percentage leads to more 
confusion and abstraction. Matthew &!wards illustrates this point: "peo-
ple don' t know what they are aware of." 147 
Third, some critics worry that consumers are unable to cope with 
the voluminous nature of disclosure mandated by TILA. Although the 
Act underwent a simplification in 1980, many academics assert that 
predatory lenders 'drown' their consumers with disclosure information 
- and then hide behind contract law' s principles of contract formation. 
Couns have consistently held that contractual parties have a duty to read 
1
•
1 Ibid. , at 903. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Matthew Edwards, "Empirical and Behavioural Critiques of Mandatory Disclosurc:Socio-
Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending" (2005) 14 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 199 
at 225. 
144 Ibid. 
'" Ronald Mann & Jim Hawkins, "Just Until Payday" (2007) 54 UCLA L. Rev. 855 at 903. 
146 Ibid., at 902. 
1•7 Supra. n. 143 at 231. 
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the terms of the agreement.143 However, when provided with such vo-
luminous and potentially confusing information, one must ask to what 
exlenl do the parties understand these tenns? The duty to read assumes 
that the consumer has actually assented to the terms, but what happens 
when this is a fiction? 
Results from a 1992 national adult literacy study suggest that most 
consumers lack the basic literacy skills to understand and compare loan 
agreements. 149 The study found that 50 per cent of Americans (including 
those with a university degree) were unable to understand the terms 
under TILA, or even know where to look for these terms under the 
mountain of information presented to them during credit negotiations. uo 
Even more surprisingly, only 4 per cent of Americans were capable of 
successfully calculating the APR. m Of course this raises the question: 
why mandate the publication of the APR when 96 per cent of Americans 
are unable to calculate it? 
In addition, American commentators have expressed increased con-
cern that payday lenders go out of their way to exacerbate TILA's 
shortcomings to achieve the highest level of information asymmetry. 
This results in a situation where neither actor is behaving in a rational 
manner, thereby nullifying the assumptions which the disclosure model 
is built upon. Techniques most often relied upon by lenders include oral 
representations, manipulating the timing of disclosure and exploiting 
English-language difficulties present in the target demographic. For 
example, many court decisions in the United States have held that con-
sumers were not authorized to rely on oral representations made (even 
if they were false) if the "true terms" were contained in writing. "A party 
who can read must read, or show a legal excuse for not doing so."is2 
Therefore a party to a written contract cannot avoid its terms due to 
inconsistent oral representations. Payday lenders have seized upon this 
interpretation by stating that .. we will tell you what you need to know" 
or informally criticizing the disclosure forms as "information you don't 
really need to get your money right now" to lull the consumer into a 
, .. Alan While & Cathy Mansfield , "Li.teracy and Contract" (2002) 13 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 
233 at 253. 
149 Ibid., at 233. 
1'° Ibid .. at 239. 
m Ibid., at 238. 
m Ibid., at 2S3. 
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false state of complacency and refocus their attention on the promise for 
quick money. 153 
· The timing of disclosure has also been widely criticized. In the vast 
majority of cases, disclosure does not occur until the contract has been 
consummated. In fact, commentators have noted that many payday loan 
offices refuse to let loan offer documentation leave the store until after 
customers have signed them. 154 This leaves little room for the consumers 
to 'shop around' and compare prices. Studies have demonstrated that at 
the contract's consummation, many consumers have already verbally 
and psychologically committed to the deal. m Consequently, it is very 
unlikely that disclosure will terminate the transaction. This is com-
pounded by the fact that the consumer has spent certain sunk costs (travel 
costs, time off work) to inquire about this specific loan and are less 
likely to repeat the process. 
To counteract these allegations, the American payday lending in-
dustry has developed a 'Best Practices' policy which states that lenders 
should provide proper disclosure information to all consumers applying 
for a loan. However, several authors note that the majority of payday 
lenders were non-compliant with this provision. 156 Furthennore, some 
lenders submit to unscrupulous behaviour in an attempt to prevent shop-
ping around. For example, some lenders verify the employment status 
of the borrower by caJling their superiors before they disclose the APR. 157 
Therefore in the case of a rational consumer who wanted to compare 
prices, their supervisor may receive several calls about this matter. Not 
only does this highlight the fact the consumer is facing financial diffi-
culties, but the supervisor may become annoyed or concerned that the 
employee is taking time to get a loan. Finally. all of these factors are 
compounded by the fact that a significant percentage of payday borrow-
ers lack English-language speaking skills. m Therefore borrowers place 
an even higher level of reliance on the payday lender to get their money, 
fast, and without too many questions. 
1
'3 Ibid., at 2S4. 
1
'" Ibid. 
'"' Peterson, ~upra, n. 17 at 895. 
ill> Johnson, supra, n. 2 at 32. 
157 Peterson, supra. n. 17 at 896. 
1
"' Edwards, supra, n. 143 at 232. 
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(b) Interest Rate Caps 
Interest rate caps basically limit the amount of interest a payday 
lender can charge on a given loan. In today's terms this usually means 
that loans must not go over a certain APR. The idea to charge interest is 
believed to have originated some time between 8000 and 5000 B.C.E.159 
Historically, what constituted 'acceptable interest' was never really de-
termined and therefore there was wide latitude for abuse - with some 
lenders charging triple and even quadruple-digit levels of interest. u;o 
Several early civilizations had instituted various interest ceilings in an 
effort to curb exploitative lenders.161 Most caps in these early societies 
were around 30 per cent APR. 162 There are several examples of modem-
day interest caps as well. For instance, New South Wales (in Australia) 
has implemented one for payday loans at 48 per cent APR. Also, the 
United States has just passed legislation allowing for an interest rate cap 
of 36 per cent APR for military personnel and their families. 163 
Traditionally, interest rate caps were criticiz:ed as they were very 
difficult to enforce and tended to significantly limit the amount of credit 
available to unattractive borrowers.164 Creditors argue that any interest 
rate cap distorts the efficiency of the market. They justify charging 
higher rates because of the high risk involved and the sunk costs asso-
ciated with administering any loan, whether it is for $200 or $20,000. 
"If the fee were limited to 35 per cent annually, lenders could only 
charge$ 1 .35 on a two-week loan for$ 100. This would not even pay for 
a store employee to process the loan." 1 6.~ Lenders argue that ceilings 
would not be profitable, and that this would shut out legitimate lenders. 
As a result, those who would take advantage of payday lenders would 
'
59 Supra, n. 17 at 808. 
1
.so Ibid., at 833. 
161 Christopher Peterson notes that a central element pertaining to interest caps that spans 
across civilizations is the recognition that some loans cause more harm than good - and 
that you could determine these loans based on price. Supra, n. 17 at 821. Jt is important to 
note that in Canada interest rate caps on small Joans also have a Jong history that can be 
traced to the 1939 Federal Small Loans Act. The Act was abolished in 1980 and the 
criminal interest rate under s. 347 was introduced at the same time. See Jacob Ziegel, "Bill 
C-44 Repeal of Small Loans Act and Enactment of New Usury Law" ( 1981) Canadian 
Bar Review 188. 
162 fbid. 
163 Mann & Hawkins, supra, n. 145 at 871. 
164 Peterson, supra, n. 17 at 825. 
16
-' Aimee Minnich, "Rational Regulatmon of Payday Lending'" (2006) 16 Kan. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol'y 84 at 92. 
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have no choice but to seek more dangerous, less 'monitored' fonns of 
loan acquisition. 166 Finally, lenders raise concerns that caps are not 
effective as the only tool to employ, as they do not necessarily strike at 
the heart of the problem associated with high-cost credit. 167 Instead, they 
urge a more systemic and socioeconomic solution. 
However, many commentators find fault in the arguments against 
interest rate caps. For example, Pearl Chin questions the profitability 
justification provided by lenders, since the increased deregulation and 
exponential growth in the industry has not lead to lower loan prices. 168 
As for decreasing availability of credit, both Keest and Drysdale argue 
that this would not necessarily be such a bad thing. 169 These individuals 
cannot afford the credit that they are getting from payday lenders in the 
first place, and only dig themselves in a deeper hole by having access 
to payday lenders. Keest and Drysdale also question whether a reduction 
in alternatives is indeed the case, since according to a study by Uriah 
King and Leslie Parrish, only 10 per cent of consumers had no other 
alternative other than a payday loan. 110 
Creditors are especially concerned with tying interest rate caps to 
the APR, as this does not give an accurate picture of the price of the 
loan. They analogize it as "stopping a taxi in Seattle and inquiring about 
the fare to San Diego." 171 Lenders cite numerous publications they make 
available to potential borrowers which clearly state that payday loans 
should only be used as a source of short-term funds. However, the 
American writing on predatory lending is awash with surveys and em-
pirical data alleging that in reality the opposite is true- and that many 
payday borrowers are borrowing for the long-tenn through the use of 
166 Peterson, supra. n. 17 at 827. 
167 Karen Gross, "Financial Literacy Education: Panacea, Palliative, or Something Worse?" 
(200S) 24 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 307. 
168 Pearl Chin, "Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation" (2004) U. Ill. L. Rev. 723 
at 740. 
, .. Lynn Drysdale&: Kathleen Keest, "'The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Mar-
ketplace: The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge to Current Thinking About the 
Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society" (2000) 51 S.C.L. Rev. 589 at 663-665. 
170 Uriah King & Leslie Parrish. Springing the Debt Trap (Center for Responsible Lending: 
2007) at 21. 
111 Frequently Asked Questions, Webpage of Moneytree Lending Inc., <http:// 
www.moneytreeinc.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=page&sectionid=63> (accessed on 
March 8, 2008). 
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rollovers.172 In fact, some go further and allege that the profit enjoyed 
by payday lenders is actually dependent on these repeat borrowers. in 
Creditors concerns notwithstanding, there is empirical evidence to 
suggest that the use of interest rate caps can be a successful form of 
consumer protection. King and Parrish conclude that stales which en-
force a comprehensive interest rate cap at around 36 per cent (for small 
loans) have "solved their debt trap problem."174 In addition, they have 
realized a savings of$1.5 billion for their citizens and "preserved a more 
responsible small loan market."175 Similarly, in a study conducted by 
the Center for Credit and Consumer Law at Griffith University, interest 
rates caps were seen as a blunt, but effective and easily enforceable tool 
that could be used by regulators to prohibit extortionate credit. 176 
(c) Education and Counselling 
Financial literacy has become the latest buzzword to exemplify the 
growing body of work signaling that most adults have not developed a 
sophisticated appreciation of the substantial financial obligations that 
they enter into. Due to this deficiency, the assumptions of contract 
bargain theory often do not hold. Joseph Smith refers to three levels of 
financial literacy. 177 The first is Financial Education and refers to the 
teaching of general financial information, without reference to specific 
goals of the individual. Overarching concepts include the consequences 
of compound interest, the importance of saving and the pitfalls of paying 
off debt with more debt. These principles could be taught at a relatively 
early stage, perhaps while consumers were still in high school. The 
second tier is known as Financial Training. 178 Financial Training refers 
to the teaching of the practical financial skills necessary to achieve 
particular goals. Applicants would have to complete programs on hom-
eownership training before they embark on a major purchase such as 
in Canadian Payday Loan Association, "New Consumer Protection Pamphlet" (available in 
March 2008 at Money Mart locations). 
''' Johnson, supra, n. 2 at 69. 
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buying their first home or car. 119 The capacity to calculate a car Joan, for 
example, will provide them with the informed ability to shop around, or 
to back out if their calculations produce a result they would not be able 
to afford. The third and final tier is Financial Counselling. 180 Financial 
Counselling refers to providing financial advice and training to a person 
in financial distress. This would include individual, targeted counselling 
that is responsive to specific behaviours and goals. Scott Schaaf notes 
that Wisconsin requires consumer credit counselling for repeat payday 
borrowers who "abuse" the system. 181 Currently financial counselling is 
required as part of the consumer bankruptcy process in both Canada and 
the United States. •112 
Proponents advocate efforts that focus on financial literacy as they 
not only minimize market distortion, but actually make them more ef-
ficient - since the actors would be behaving even mare rationally in 
maximizing their own bargains. Furthermore education requires less 
direct governmental influence, and is therefore not seen as paternalistic 
as the other options. Smith notes, however, that the impact of these 
different tiers is varied. iu The weakest impact occurs within the first 
tier. Financial Counselling and Training were cited as much more effec-
tive. Smith highlights that while pre-transaction counselling is very 
effective, post-transaction counselling can also be beneficial. 184 
Others, such as Jean Braucher, argue that education can produce 
important benefits, but only in the long-term and only if structural factors 
are also modified She suggests that the traditional dichotomy between 
structural and cultural factors should be abandoned, as structural changes 
actually inform consumer culture. 185 Policies that are primarily used to 
change consumer culture, therefore, will do linle to change habits when 
pitted against strong structural causes of overindebtedness. She argues 
that efforts to create a culture of personal financial responsibility requires 
a systematic application and could easily take a generation or more to 
'"Ibid. 
100 Ibid., at 84. 
111 Schaaf, supra, n. 24 at 352. 
112 Bank"'ptcyand fnsolvencyAct, R.S.C. 1985,c. 8 -3, s. 157. 1; 11U.S.C.§109(hXl)(West 
2005). 
113 Smith, supra, n. 177 at 98. 
IM Jbid. 
''° Jean Braucher, "1beories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of Structure and Culture" 
(2006) 7 Theoretical Inquires L. 323 at 325. 
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take hold. 186 For example, initiatives intended to stimulate individual 
savings must contend with strong marketing designed to stimulate credit 
use. 
In this vein, Laurie Burlingame advocates using the internet to 
develop infonnation sources that would be responsible for collecting 
infonnation about specific lenders. 187 She dismisses policies that rely 
entirely on enhanced disclosure and consumer education, as many fi-
nancial decisions are likely to be very difficult for most Americans to 
fully absorb. Due to limits in cognitive capacity, consumers are left with 
no choice but to filter out the majority of the infonnation they receive 
and rely instead on rules ofthumb. 1118 Unfortunately this technique tends 
to fail as consumers overestimate their ability to control events and 
disregard low-level risk and probabilities of hann. They also feel pres-
sure to close these transactions as soon as possible, as the decision is 
taking up a significant amount of time, stress and resources.189 
Other commentators are also not convinced that general education 
is the most efficient use of resources to help fight against predatory 
lending. For example, David Friedman argues that education and leg-
islative schemes with broad targets actually preclude effective enforce-
ment.190 Furthennore, consumer behaviour will not change overnight 
with education initiatives. Instead consumer protection should target 
certain groups and provide effective protection for them. By identifying 
concentrated. less resource-intensive 'surgical' tactics, policymakers 
will remove the many incentives of fraud perpetrators.191 In essence, if 
policies were designed to actively monitor a selected population, lenders 
would know there was a significant likelihood they would get caught. 
Karen Gross criticizes the marketing of 'money education' as a tool 
for "all that ails the consumercrediteconomy."192 In her opinion it leads 
to a 'blame the victim' type of mentality "by erroneously assuming that 
1116 Ibid., at 323. 
1
"' Laurie Burlingame, "A Pro-Consumer Approach to Predatory Lending: Enhance Protec-
tion Through Federal Legislation and New Approaches to Education" (2006) 6()Consumer 
Fin. L. Q . Rep. 460 at 483. 
"' Ibid. 
1
"' Ibid., at 481. 
100 David Friedman, "Reinvesting Consumer Protection" (2007) 57 DcPaul L. Rev. 45. 
191 Ibid., at 46. 
1
"' Karen Gross, "Financial Literacy Education: Panacea, Palliative, or Something Worse?" 
(2005) 24 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 307. 
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individual knowledge acquisition alone will produce a fundamental 
change in markets. " 193 In fact, she argues that education serves to mask 
more disturbing root causes of many of these financial problems. She 
emphasizes the importance of asset-building in low income communities 
and eliminating misleading marketing messages that exploit infonnation 
asymmetries.194 Gross suggests changing the credit model to incorporate 
different types of payment (such as making childcare payments or paying 
rent to build credit history for excluded groups).19s 
6. REVISmNG THE CANADIAN REGULATORY SCHEME 
Iain Ramsay, writing in 2000, produced the most wide-reaching 
and significant Canadian report on access to credit in the alternative 
consumer credit market. 196 The report applied key concepts and theories 
underpinning consumer protection regulation more generally to various 
markets that vulnerable consumers were turning to for credit. In writing 
the report. he noted that there was little public knowledge in Canada of 
the problems of low-income and marginalized consumers in obtaining 
credit. 197 At the time there was little media interest in the issue and 
middle-income consumers were profiting from their ownership of fi-
nancial institutions that bought. and sold subprime loans. Payday loans 
were unregulated. 
Since 2000 much has changed. The payday lending industry in 
Canada has grown significantly. Middle-income consumers have been 
financially impacted by the subprime lending crisis in the United States 
through their investment portfolios and stories of payday lending have 
become common place in all arenas ranging from coffee shops to church 
sennons to presidential campaign platforms. In addition, a number of 
parallel provincial reform efforts are underway in Canada to regulate 
payday lenders. The Canadian provinces have or are in the process of 
implementing legislation that will make use of a combination of the 
regulatory tools used by the various American regimes. 
Canada, like other common law systems, uses its bankruptcy sys-
tem as the primary form of regulation of overindebtness. Because con-
.., Ibid. 
194 Ibid., at 309-310. 
19' Ibid., at 31 ().311 . 
,,... Ramsay, supra, n. 24. 
197 Ibid. 
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sumer bankruptcy is largely a middle-class phenomenon the law focuses 
on that income group. Even though filing for bankruptcy costs several 
thousand dollars, most of those considering bankruptcy can afford to 
pay, drawing either upon their earnings or their friends and family. But 
because bankruptcy law requires such significant out-of-pocket pay-
ments, bankruptcy is less accessible to poor debtors than to middle-class 
debtors.198 At the same time, the democratization of credit is well under 
way in Canada, meaning that credit is increasingly available to lower 
income debtors.199 
The regulation of payday loans holds the potential of extending the 
benefits of regulating overindebtness, currently provided via bankruptcy 
legislation to the middle-class, to lower income debtors. This potential 
needs to be balanced against their needs and corresponding benefits 
resulting from access to alternative credit markets, such as the payday 
lending market. Situated in this context, the penultimate section of the 
article evaluates the current reform efforts by drawing upon the Amer-
ican experience with the various regulatory tools the provinces are now 
drawing upon as well as the visits to the six Toronto payday lenders. 
(a) Disclosure 
The provincial regulation requires disclosure in the form of posted 
warnings and information in agreements about the cost of credit and the 
high cost of the loans. Commentators reflecting on the American expe-
rience with disclosure as a tool for limiting predatory practices used by 
payday lenders suggest that disclosure should be made in the form of 
clear costs of borrowing rather than APR. That is, it should be clearly 
stated that a loan will cost, for example, $20 for $100 borrowed for one 
week, totaling $120 for one week. Any additional fees should also be 
clearly noted. The total cost should be posted clearly at the front of the 
store or on the counter in a similar fashion to the way that banks post 
the daily exchange rate. In addition, the posted notice should clearly 
indicate that these loans are intended to be short-term. The Ontario 
legislation, like the other proposed and proclaimed provincial legisla-
tion? attempts to provide for this information1 however, as was evidenced 
'"See: Stephanie Bcn-lshai & Saul Schwartz, "Bankruptcy for the Poor" (2007) 45(3) 
Osgoodc Hall L.J . 471 and Stephanie Bcn-Ishai, ''The Gendered NatureofSocial Insurance 
for the Non-Poor in Canada .. (2005) 43.3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 289. 
100 Ben-lshai & Schwartz, ibid. 
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by the on-site visits, the variation in the way that this infonnation was 
provided made it difficult to understand and also difficult to compare 
among stores. 
Doubt is cast on the potential of disclosure as a regulatory tool by 
the research on bounded rationality that suggests that consumers do not 
always act in the rational way that underlies the rationale for disclo-
sure. 200 As is highlighted by the research on the American experience 
with disclosure regulation, various other factors, such as convenience 
and sunk search costs, may limit the utility of disclosure.wt On the other 
hand, the provision of comparative price and tenn information by a 
neutral third party has been put forward as the most effective fonn of 
disclosure. 202 None of the current provincial regulatory schemes or pro-
posals provide for this relatively low-cost measure. 
(b) Licensing 
Licensing of payday lenders by third party provincially regulated 
bodies holds the potential to address the issues surrounding the utility 
of disclosure. In addition to serving a gatekeeping function, such bodies 
are in a position to provide an effective form of information disclosure, 
including comparative information. To assist customers with shopping 
around prior to visiting a payday lender, licensees should be required to 
provide daily reports of fees to the licensor, who should in tum make 
these available to potential borrowers on the internet or through other 
means. Further, on-site visits from provincial regulators may deter lend-
ers from making oral representations that contradict posted disclosure, 
disclosure in agreements, or provincial legislation. The on-site visits to 
the Toronto payday lenders illustrate that large operators are violating 
the self-regulatory standards they helped craft surrounding rollovers, for 
example. 
The funding for on-site visits would come from licensing costs paid 
by the payday lenders. The challenge will be for the licensing body to 
resist becoming "captured" by the payday lending industry. This concern 
should be factored into decisions surrounding the appropriate licensing 
framework. That is, whether the licensor should be within the provincial 
200 Ramsay, supra, n. 24 at 30. 
101 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
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consumer affairs ministry or a delegated administrative authority where 
an arm's length agency administers the regime. The provinces where 
there is a public utility commission or board appear to have delegated 
authority to these semi-autonomous provincially regulated bodies. The 
other provinces appear to have taken the former approach. 
(c) Rollovers 
Each province that has put forward regulation has prohibited roll-
overs or charging an additional fee for a rollover. This prohibition is 
also found in the industry's self-regulation. Given that rollovers are 
clearly a regular practice associated with the business model for payday 
lenders operating in Canada, and that the existing prohibition imposed 
by payday lenders' self-regulatory body is ignored by lenders, a different 
approach is necessary. It may be more reasonable to regulate the con-
ditions for a rollover to take place and to require disclosure of not only 
the cost of the loan but also the cost of a rollover. In addition, a cap may 
be set on the number of times a rollover may be permitted and posted 
warnings about the high cost of rollovers may be considered. 
( d) Enforcement 
While class actions have entered the scene as an attempt to use the 
judicial system to obtain a remedy for usurious interest rates charged by 
payday lenders, the results remain to be seen. Class actions aside, most 
low income borrowers will not have the resources to take action in court 
against payday lenders. Accordingly, the most effective method for 
enforcing the requirements in the new legislation is a simple vehicle for 
complaint to the licensor that will result in non-recovery of the loan 
amount by the lender. A number of the proposed or existing provincial 
regimes merely provide that the interest will not be recoverable if the 
legislation is violated. This is an insufficient form of deterrence; the 
principle and interest should not be repayable. Detailed statistics should 
be kept on all on-site visits, complaints, and resolutions. 
(e) Education and Counselling 
In contrast to some American states, counselling has not been 
adopted as part of the provincial regulatory models. While there has 
been much criticism regarding the counselling requirement for bank-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ruptcy in Canada, it may be a helpful tool, when used in conjunction 
with the other tools discussed, in this context. Potential borrowers should 
be required to participate in a counselling session prior to taking a second 
payday loan in a set period of time or attempting to rollover a payday 
loan. Such sessions may be provided online for literate consumers or in 
person and should be financed through the payday lenders, but provided 
by the government through the licensing body or another delegated 
authority. The counselling cost should not be passed on to potential 
borrowers. 
The main criticism leveled against counselling in the bankruptcy 
context is that it adopts a "blame the victim" approach and focuses on 
helping the debtor adopt better financial management practices. While 
in some instances instruction on better budgeting practices may be help-
ful, often low income debtors will simply not have the money available 
to budget with. It would be more useful to outline the borrower's rights 
with respect to their outstanding payday loans. For example, the fact 
that it is not cost effective for payday lenders to commence an action 
against a borrower for an unpaid loan, may be helpful information to a 
debtor contemplating her options. In addition, a detailed explanation of 
the costs associated with rolling over a loan and exploration of other 
possible sources of longer term credit may be helpful. . 
Consideration should also be given to introducing some form of 
financial education into the high school curriculum or even college and 
university level curriculum. In addition, public education sessions fi-
nanced by the licensing fees paid by payday lenders and held by licensors 
would be helpful. The OPLEF provided for under the new Ontario 
legislation provides a model for this approach. The implementation of 
either form of education should not be used to justify limiting other 
measures such as disclosure or interest rate caps. 
(t) Interest Rate Caps 
As increased regulatory measures are imposed on payday lenders 
they will undoubtedly argue that these measures will drive them out of 
business. The democratization of credit that payday lenders have helped 
facilitate is not in itself a bad thing and should not be treated as such. 
The Quebec experience, where registration and a maximum interest cap 
of 35 per cent are in place, and where there are no payday lenders 
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operating in the jurisdiction may be used to illustrate the impact that 
regulatory decisions may have on the continued viability of the industry. 
However, it is important to highlight that Credit Unions have played _a 
much more prevalent role in the Quebec alternative credit market, and 
accordingly, interest rate caps are not a complete explanation. 203 Further, 
the American experience suggests that payday lenders can adapt their 
business model to a regulated lending environment with interest rate 
caps. In implementing interest rate caps, it will be important to follow 
Ramsay's line of reasoning, .. there is probably a convincing argument 
that may be made for using interest rate ceilings as a method of protecting 
against excessive rates but not as a means of second guessing market 
rates.'0204 Market rates in this context need to account for the current 
practice of not performing credit checks or detailed assessments of 
ability to pay prior to providing payday loans to borrowers in Canada. 
Introducing such practices in this market will limit access to credit for 
groups of borrowers that are otherwise excluded from accessing credit 
and potentially push them into even more ex.pensive and unregulated 
arenas. 
To date, other than Quebec, only Manitoba has settled on an interest 
rate cap. A formula that attaches both to the changing markets and limits 
on excessive rates will need to be developed as the other provinces move 
forward. Consultation on appropriate rates should not be limited to the 
lenders or financial ex.perts, but should also include poverty experts and 
payday loan consumers. 
(g) Provincial Harmonization 
The Uniform Law Conference of Canada appears to have given 
limited attention to the issue of payday lenders following the amendment 
to the Criminal Code giving the provinces the ability to regulate in this 
><>> Ibid., at 37. Given that the Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over banking, 
interests and negotiable insllUments. and the provinces over property and civil rights, there 
may be a constitutional issue related to tne provinces setting interest rate caps. However, 
as Mary Anne Waldron has concluded, "while the Federal government was given the 
exclusive power to legislate on interest in the constitution, the provincial legislatures have 
been permitted by the courts to can: out a significant and, perhaps widening sphere of 
jurisdiction." M . Waldron, Tht I.Aw of Interest in Canada (Carswell: 1992) at 28, as cited 
in Ramsay supra, n. 24 at 27. 
2°' Ramsay, supra, n. 24 at 32. 
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area.~ The Consumer Measures Committee (CMC), a federal-provin-
cial-territorial intergovernmental working group that seeks national ap-
proaches to consumer protection issues has also given the issue limited 
consideration.206 Ontario's Ministry of Government Services Policy and 
Consumer Protection Services Division indicates that its "preference is 
for a harmonized national approach to regulation and interest rate setting, 
with a federal lead on rate setting to create a national standard for the 
industry."207 However, to date an analysis and recommendations sur-
rounding the harmonization of payday lending legislation has not been 
provided and multiple provincial attempts at reform appear to be simul-
taneously proceeding without an attempt at national consultation. Ram-
say provided a Model Act with his report in 2000, however, a harmonized 
approach has not been adopted by the provinces. It continues to be true 
that vulnerable consumers' interests and needs with respect to payday 
lenders do not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction so as to justify the 
variation in existing and proposed legislation in this area continue,* 
however, there remains no Canadian experience to justify choosing one 
regulatory approach over another. 
Ultimately an effort should be made to work towards a Model Act. 
However, at this early stage in seeking to regulate a previously unre-
gulated industry variation in provincial regulation may be a useful way 
to assess the effectiveness of various approaches to regulating the in-
dustry. In addition, future work will need to consider the limits of 
domestic regulation of payday lenders and the extent to which the inter-
net and other technologies are facilitating payday lending across provin-
cial and national borders. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This article has focused on assessing the evolving Canadian payday 
lending regulatory framework as a discrete area of regulation of over-
indebtness of low income Canadians. A detailed assessment and com-
parison of the regulation of other forms of credit in the alternative credit 
im Babe, sup ra, n. 65. 
""' M Alternative Consumer Credit - Working Group" online: Consumer Measures Committee 
< htcp://crocwcb.ca/epic/site/cmc-cmc .nsf/en/fe00025e.html>. 
207 Consumer Protection in the Payday Lending Sector (April 27, 2007) online: < http:// 
www.gov.on.ca/mgslgraphics/ 126614.pdf>. 
208 Ramsay. supra. n. 24 at 27. 
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market was beyond the scope of the current project. The ability and the 
willingness of the provinces to regulate payday loans following Bill C-
26 provide a unique opening. The development of ex-ante regulation 
that will at the same time continue to grant low-income Canadians access 
to credit through payday loans and protect them from predatory prac-
tices, provides an occasion to reflect on best practices for regulating 
overindebtness of lower income Canadians. Up until this point, for the 
most part, only middle-class Canadians had access to expansive regu-
lation and relief from overindebtness through the bankruptcy regime. 
While an increasing number of low-income Canadians now have access 
to credit, they continue to have limited access to the bankruptcy regime. 
Apart from measures aimed at increasing access to this ex-post remedy, 
the current process of providing ex-ante relief is also promising. In order 
to make this form of regulation meaningful lessons from the American 
experience should be taken seriously and regulation that is helpful to the 
actual consumers of payday loans should be carefully developed. An 
ongoing effort should be undertaken to evaluate and compare provincial 
efforts at regulation with a view to developing a domestic, and possibly 
in the future, international model payday lending legislation. 
The provincial reform efforts may contribute to the development 
of a heightened sense of corporate social responsibility on the part of 
payday lenders, which may in turn also facilitate a change in their lending 
practices. As the payday lending industry expands in Canada, an increas-
ing number of payday loans are offered by publicly traded corporations 
that are accountable to an increasing number of shareholders and other 
corporate stakeholders. Future research should consider the role of Ca-
nadian corporate and securities law in facilitating a change in the cor-
porate governance practices of payday lenders. In addition, further re-
search is necessary on the role of regulation and governance practices 
in ensuring that mainstream financial institutions operate in a socially 
responsible way in relation to lower income debtors. 
Canadian banks, like their American counterparts, have been quite 
reluctant to deal with low-income borrowers in a more direct fashion. 
·They risk criticism if they reject too many customers, or charge higher 
interests rates or use remedies such as foreclosure.209 Therefore, there is 
2<l9 Hellwig, supra , n. 138 at 1:582; MacDonnell, supra, n. 32 at 49 . 
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a tendency for larger financial institutions to just avoid an area, making 
it very attractive to predatory lenders. This practice dates back to the 
middle of the twentieth century when many American banks discrimi· 
nated against certain racialized neighbourhoods through the practice of 
redlining.210 As a result, Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA) to mandate financial institutions "serve the convenience and 
needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do business". 21 1 
Federal examiners evaluate a bank's community reinvestment efforts 
through three tests in lending, investments and service.212 These ratings 
are published for the public to review. The examiners can also deny 
applications or place conditions on the approval of deposit facilities if 
the CRA ratings are not adequate.213 The CRA seeks to balance a bank's 
benefits and burdens: banks that profit from community deposits should 
be encouraged to extend credit to those same communities.m 
The CRA provided some direction for the Canadian Department of 
Finance's White Paper on "Reforming Canada's Financial Services Sec-
tor. "m In that document, increased CRA-style disclosure was recom-
mended, but it was noted that a full CRA regime is not warranted in 
Canada, and that other mechanisms could be used to promote account-
ability.216 Instead of the CRA, the paper proposed that all financial 
institutions with equity of over $1 billion disclose information on their 
philanthropy, their employees' community service, and their efforts to 
promote small businesses, micro-credit, and access to banking services. 
Some of these recommendations were adopted in Bill C-8, An Act to 
Establish the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada and to Amend 
Certain Acts in Relation to Financial lnstitutions.2 17 The Act created the 
110 Tiie term redlining originated from a lender's habit of outlining a specific 'poor neigh-
bourhood' in red 10 indicate and exclude the area from lending as it was too high risk. 
211 Emily Berkman, "Microloans as a Community Reinvestment Act Compliance Strategy" 
(2006) N.Y.U.J .L. & Bus. 329. 
212 /bid. 
213 Ibid. 
2
" lbid. 
"" Finance Canada, "Reforming Canada's Fi~ancial Services Sector: A Framework for tile 
Future:· (Finance Canada, 1999). 
216 /bid. 
211 Bill C-8, An Act 10 Establish tht Financial Consunuir Agtncy of Canada and to Am#!nd 
Certain Acts in Relation to Financial Tnstitwions. I st Scss.,37th Parl.. 2001 online: < http:/ 
/www2.parl.gc.ca/HouscPublications/Publication.aspx?Docld = 23310 I 4&Language =e 
&Mode= I> (assented to 14June 2001), 2001. c. 9. 
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Financial Consumer Agency, responsible for making sure banks follow 
through on their obligations under the Bill, and requires institutions with 
equity of over $1 billion to publish an annual "Public Accountability 
Statement" providing the information detailed above.218 However, critics 
feel that this is still inadequate, as it does not provide information about 
demand for financing, and whether the banks are appropriately meeting 
the demand.2 19 Nor does it produce regular data based on neighbourhood 
(only by province), or by the characteristics of borrowers, unlike the 
infonnation produced under the CRA. 
The inquiries into whether Canada should move closer to the United 
States in adopting CRA style legislation and the role that corporate 
governance practices and regulation play in improving payday lending 
practices are important research questions as Canada moves forward 
with a regulatory scheme that takes into account the increasing democ-
ratization of credit. 
rn Ibid., s. 3. 
m "Comparison of Amendments set out in Bill C-8 to Financial Institution and other Laws 
vs. CCRC Recommendations" (200 I) online: CCRC < http://www.cancrc.orgfenglish/re 
commOl.html> . 
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borrower's right to 
cancel lhc klul 
withi.n 48 houn aft.er 
reccivins die inirial 
advance. 
llGUoYer Cannot palll Llmi1 on c1mJes for No payday lender No rollovers, no 
PrMlbldnM rollovas: or new exteGsioa, renewal or shall put a new loans where 
loan when cxisliag repilccmenc (s. 152 d rolloYa' lolui (s. aia.aftady 
lolll Cx!AS fiom Act, not yet ellllCled). 37.34). cllist wldl !be 
the same lender (s. same lender 
112.~). (18N(c)(b)). 
Ollbrlo Prtllce Edward 
..... 
Lieuletwlt Governor Al the rime of 
maymalie loin, borrower 
iqulaliolll 
-aec• 
ao-moa documenl sayina 
infOllllMioo 1ex1, or 11111 ii is a hiab 
1enm lhll a leader is COil bm, pving 
NqUiNd IO incl ... in riJ:ht IO 
• payday lou C811CCllllioll (s. 
agreemelt. Abo may 
...... .. plalioea 
12), 
ao-.iins die form 
lhll a Jcadcr is 
n:quiRd to ux for 
lbc iafonnation, texl 
or tams (1. 77.21· 
22,l'LA). 
Tiie Icnder Ulldcr a Can't acc:epr 
payday ..... 
.-rmcat few 
qreemnt shill not CllleDSion "' 
- llllO & llCW miewal of IOID 
payday._. except as 
.,_-wlbthc 8Ulborized by an 
borrower before • order oftbe 
1-lteewadsyshave Commiulon (1. 
.,...i siDcc tbc 16). 
bom>wallM.,.W 
Qmllec Sia. 
NA. Before-U., 
into loin. lllUll 
provide 
dilclooure 
<kicumeGI 
llltin1 that chis 
is a hip. coot 
loin, i11eludc Ill 
c~of 
all amounts 
chqed.. lftd 
give nocM:e of 
can<:cllation 
riahU (s. 20). 
NA. No C09CUl'leDI 
loans are 
pcrmiaed (s. 
28); rcacwal 
loans doll't 
~tobc 
Cllplicidy 
prohibited (1. 23 
jlllt says dial 
leaden~'! 
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Bridlk Colaallla Mulloba New Brunick Nov.Scotia O.W"io 
Ille Cull OUISWlding 
balance under the 
tint agreement (s. 
33(1). Pl.A). 
No lo8ll brom shall 
racililllle the lllllkiag 
of more than one 
~yloaa 
agreement bet~n 
the same borrower 
and different lenders 
unless seven days 
have passed since the 
borrower has paid 
Ille OUISlaDding 
balance under the 
tint agreemeat (s. 
3~3) or Pl.A). 
The Jc9der Wider a 
payday loan 
agreement shall not 
eiueod 1he agreement 
unle5$ lhe 
regulations permit 
eiuensioos of payday 
loen agreemenu and 
the eJltmsioo 
complies with tbe 
prescribed 
requiremelllS (s. 
3«1), PLA). 
Lieuteaant Governor 
may make 
Prt.ce l'.dwud Quebec 
lsla8d 
s.st. 
charge more 
than maximum 
set by 
regulalion ror 
renewals). 
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Brtdlla c.lutWll Mulloba Newlnmwlck No\'11 Saitla 
Licieullta Requires payday O.e ~ license C()5IS May lpply lO Need pemil 10 
lmden IObe SS,500; mUSI provide MiniSler for give payday 
litensed ud sample io.n documents liceDM; must pay loaes. can set 
regullles aspects for a $300 loan lhal fee and provide die pcnnil lluougb 
of their complies wilh applicatioe and all regisnr and 
lnMaClioas with reiulations and an ocher documents must pay fees 
coaswnen. undenalting from required by die (1 8C-D). 
dirccwr lhal 5l1lc k.nows Mini...,. ( .. 37. 12-
Licemina and about Ille coosumcr t • ): licensee must 
compliance procection laws (s. 7. also provide boad 
c:nforccmcot will 8); licensees must also (s. 36. IS). 
be .dmirustered provide boods (s. 10). 
by die Bwiness 
Practices and 
Consumer 
Protection 
Authority , a llC)(-
for-profit 
orguizalion llW 
operlleS • arm's 
length from 
..,........__ 
Coasullalion is 
cuncnlly in 
proams oo 
licensing 
rcq..m ...... ia. 
o.tarill 
replllions as 10 the 
definition o( wbal 
coes1it111e1 an 
extension of a 
payday loan 
aaieemem (s. 77 .24 
Pl.A). 
Each payday leader 
(s. 6( I )). 11111 lolll 
broker (•. 6(2)) i• 
required IO hold a 
license issued by lhe 
Registrv. The 
Regisuvcan 
sUlpCllli or n:volu: a 
1icmse in some cases 
(s. 12). fJI selecled 
~ lhe applicant 
for a license (or a 
renewal) is entided 
lO I '-'ing before 
the License Appeal 
tribunal (s. 13(7)). 
An applicalll for a 
licmse (or ienewal) 
must disclooe 
changes in corponlC 
coacrol and 8'ldl"5$ 
(s. 22( I)). The 
Regillnr may• any 
time rcqu.ire a 
licensee IO provide 
the Registrv with 
copies of~ 
Prt.c:e Edwd <>-'* 
......... 
Licenses are ~-required. need only gnnt.ed 
• application 10 lenden 
and fee 10 get wbo chlrge 
one (SS. 3-4 ). a maximum 
3S*' APR. 
1bere are no 
legal payday 
lenders in 
Quet.ec. 
s.11. 
Liceueaare 
required (s. 5-
6). aad '~nder 
may be requinld 
IO provide a 
bond or o«her 
financial 
""'wily (•- 7). 
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Brllilll Colulbia MultoM New Bnlllswick 
POIUd Qucstioas Sign must say "Payday Payday lender must 
Wanamp pertaining to a Loans are High-Cost post signs that 
disclosl.re regime Loans" and give the clwty set out full 
wasioch~in cost in dollars for a cost of credit (s. 
the BC $300 loan (s. 16). 37.3). 
Consultation 
P9per. ThiJ is in conjunction 
with s. 156 [not yet 
,, 
enacted]. 
' All lenders l!IU$I post 
signs. The signs must 
be posted promi11C11tly 
and in ..:conlance with 
the regulations, and 
must clearly and 
undcrsundably set Olli. 
in the form required by 
the regulalioos, 
(a) all compooew of 
the .-of credi~ 
includina all fees. 
cbarges. penaltles, 
interest and other 
amounts and 
CORlidc:ration for a 
represetllalive payday 
loan trusaclion: and 
Nova ScGcill Oalariil 
thal the licensee uses 
or proposes to ._ in 
the course of 
conducting business 
(s. 47(2)) (all 
sections pertain to 
thePLA). 
Oovemot in 61.1(4)ofthc 
Council can Con.s111Ur Prottction 
make regulaliOllS Acr requires specific 
regarding the discloslll'O on the 
display of fees. cost of borrowing. 
chatges. rlleS 
and prodll!ts 
offered (I 8U(k)). 
Priace F.dward 
blucl 
MUSI post signs 
1hat set Olli. 
clearly and 
proro.iDC11tly, all 
componeats of 
1lle cost of 
credit. including 
fees, charges. 
interest, cu:. (s. 
20). 
Q.ebec Sak. 
NA. M"" past sign 
se1ting out costs 
of all 
COq>OMlll$ of 
cost of credit (s. 
21). 
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Bridmc.lulblll ~ Newlnmwick N0\'11~ 
(b) any ocbc.-
infortnllion requind by 
the regulalions. 
~ Borrower docsil't AnadminiSU'llli~ If there isa Regislra' can 
have topeyoris penalty (of$ I 000. vioi.tion of the inab leodcn 
et1lilled to refund $3000, or SSOO>) can maximum cap on icimbune 
for any lllOllCY be levied if there is • cost of ciedit. then borro-for 
peid OVCI' !he vio!Mioa of lbc the lcada mmt any expcDX3 IO 
maximum sec; if muilllWll credit ctmae Rimbune or canDOI which laden 
there is a rollo-. or limits oa charges or charge the ll'ell 't enlitlcd 
bom> ..... doesn't reoewab (s. 19); 1lle bom>wcr ror any (12A); Uthe lou 
have to pey or is lenda must reimlxne amount cllarged in ~mentsays 
ealilled to a refund bcJrrower for fees relation 10 the total that borrower 
of anything over chorpd ova the cost of ctedit of the muat n:pey more 
the principal or the maximum {s. 147 or loan (37 .31 (2){b ); ir lltan maximum, 
fust loan (112.10). Act) or for rolloven (s. there's a rollover, borrower only 
152). dcblor is llO< liable bas IO repay 
for any amounts principal and DOI 
relating to cost of cost of credit 
credit for pro- (18P). 
existing Joan (s. 
37.34). 
. 
Olltllrle 
Rtgisttlr has tie 
abilitytoref.,.. 
licenses, prohibit the 
Ule of cenain 
pnctioes, clcmand 
adminiSCl'llli~ fines 
tllll caanoc go o-
$10,000 (s. 59, 
PLA). 
1lle Director CID 
make orders fneziag 
money or &$$dS of 
pcnoo iovol V<ld in 
proceedinp lbat 
infringe upon the 
PLA. (s. 52, PLA). 
With reprds to false 
advc:.tising: the 
Direclor can also 
order a CC$Salion 
aodlor inandaiory 
poblicalioit of. 
e«reetion. (s. 53( I), 
PLA). 
PriKer.dwud Q9ellec 
....... 
If the lenda NA. 
violates the cap, 
lllUSI return 10 
borrower all 
comider·ation 
gi~n to pay for 
COSI of credit in 
loan (s. II); if 
lender takes fees 
for roll~. 
must refund any 
amount charged 
there (s. 16). 
s.k. 
Leedu must 
refund all loan 
c.twges above 
the maximum 
set by 
regulalioo (s. 
24). 
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